

T H E
D I F F E R E N C E,
B E T W E E N
W O R D S, E S T E E M E D S Y N O N Y M O U S,
I N T H E
E N G L I S H L A N G U A G E,
A N D

The Proper CHOICE of them determined:

T O G E T H E R W I T H

So much of Abbé GIRARD's Treatise, on this Subject,
as would agree, with our Mode of Expression.

Useful, to ALL, who would, either, write or speak, with
PROPRIETY, and, ELEGANCE.

I N T W O V O L U M E S.

V O L. I.

D U B L I N :
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M, DCC, LXXVI.

THE
DIFFERENCE

BETWEEN

WORDS, ESTABLISHED SYNONYMS,

ENGLISH



AND

The Proper CHOICE of them for mind.

TOGETHER WITH

So much of ALPHABETICAL TABLES as are proper
as would agree with our Mode of Expression.

Utihi, to aid, who would, either, with or speak, with
PROPERTY, not, MISPLACED.

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I.

DUBLIN:

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1888.

W. G. GRIFFIN

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

PHILIP, EARL STANHOPE,

VISCOUNT MAHON, F. R. S.

S I R,

TO whom could a work of this kind, which is, a disquisition of what, others have spent a whole life, without the least attention to, be inscribed, with any seeming propriety, if not, to a gentleman, who has, himself, passed years, in the researches of literature; but, setting aside its propriety, on this account; the obligations, you, and your lordship's family, have been pleased to confer on me, and,

A 2

mine,

vi DEDICATION.

mine, are sufficient, to engross my continual respect, and, claim every acknowledgement in my power to make: accept, then, Sir, this public testimony of it; and, be assured, the dedicating this work to your lordship, proceeds more from an ambition of being thought one, of your many admirers, than, from any view of profiting, by your lordship's patronage.

Believe me, Sir, with the profoundest respect,

Your Lordship's most obliged,

and, most obedient,

humble servant,

LONDON,
May 21, 1766.

THE AUTHOR.





A
TRANSLATION
OF

Abbé GIRARD'S

P R E F A C E.

IF society be formed, by the communication of ideas and sentiments, speech, is, undoubtedly, its most essential and most graceful band, being, at once, the pencil of the mind, the image of its operations, and, the interpreter of the heart. The more, we go
abroad,

abroad, among men, the more, we perceive, that language, is the true seasoning of every delight. When all things else fail, or, when through age, we have no other enjoyment, that of conversation, will furnish amusement in our latter hours, and, will, at that time, grow more and more satisfactory; as it will, in some measure, make up for the want of those pleasures, we are incapable of receiving. In all times, and, on all occasions, speech is delightful: there can be no true happiness, without the joys of the mind; no good fortune, that we do not long to make known; no secret, we do not wish to communicate; no tender sentiment, we are not anxious to declare; no system, we do not thirst to unfold; no evil, we are not eager to complain of; no comfort, without the sympathetic breathings of friendship; no reputation, without the voice of renown;
in

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in a word, nothing, without the aid of language, at least, nothing, which can satisfy our understandings, or, flatter our inclinations. Who then would be so indolent, as, to pay no attention to the graces, or, so wanting, as to disregard the power of one faculty, which gives lustre to every other? A polite nation, can never entertain notions, injurious to true taste. Good education extends her care, equally, to the language of a people, as, their morals: she does not confine herself, to the adorning of the mind, inwardly, with wisdom, science, and, virtue; but, labours, also, to grace it, outwardly, by teaching it the art of shewing itself to advantage. Her desire is, that our expressions should correspond with our thoughts, and, that our reputation should be answerable to our merit. Speech, then, deserves our best attention, and we ought to think ourselves,

indebted to those, who study its cultivation; whether by learned rules, drawn up according to its peculiar genius, to give a knowledge of it, with precision; or, by judicious criticisms, in order, to preserve its purity, without rejecting the new advantages, of which, it is susceptible; or, by such useful acquisitions, as may enrich it, without rendering it unintelligible. But how much should we be obliged to that person, who could in any measure fix it, and, put a stop to those many innovations which mere caprice, daily, strives to introduce? This is a task, I fear, beyond the power of individuals: the destiny of whatever is living, forbids its continuing, always, in the same state. However, be the fate of our language, in after-ages, as it may; neither the fear of its alteration, nor, even, its annihilation, shall deter me from publishing the observations I have made.

made. They have neither the rules of grammar, nor the purity of custom, for their object, but the delicate difference, only, between words, reputed synonymous; that is to say, the distinguishing characteristics of such words, as, resembling each other, in their general idea, may, nevertheless, be distinguishable, one from another, by some additional one, peculiar to each of them; from whence arises, on many occasions, a necessity of choice, in order to use them with propriety, and, elegance; a thing, as uncommon, as it is beautiful; and, by which taste is enabled to give brilliancy to truth, and, solidity to wit. Avoiding all empty words, it teaches us to reason soundly; averse to the abuse of terms, it makes our diction intelligible; judicious in the choice of words, it gives ease and elegance to our expressions: with the greatest accuracy, it banishes all far-fetched,

fetched, vague and spiritless images, with which the trifling and superficial, are content to express themselves; an enemy to confusion, it prevents our rambling in the study of the sciences; in short, I will venture to affirm, that this spirit of justness and distinction, is the true ray that shines; and, in conversation, is the lively touch, that distinguishes the man of delicacy and discernment, from the vulgar and illiterate.

In order to acquire this justness, we must be a little nice upon words, not imagining, that such, as are called synonymous, are really so, exactly uniform in their sense, and, resemble each other, as perfectly, as two drops of water from the same spring: for, on a closer examination, we shall see, that this resemblance, does not take in the whole extent and force of signification; but consists, only, in one principal

cipal idea, which, they all express; each word differing from the other, by some relative one, which constitutes its proper and particular character. That resemblance, which conveys one general idea, makes, then, the words, synonymous; and, the difference, that arises from the particular idea, that accompanies the general, makes them, far from being perfectly alike, distinguishing them, as various shades of the same colour.

I will not, absolutely, say, that there are not occasions, on which, so nice a choice may be dispensed with; but, I maintain, that there are still more, where they ought not, or, cannot pass one for another, especially, in studied and elaborate compositions. I will allow it to be a matter of indifference, in choosing a yellow habit, whether we take the hue of the marigold or jonquil; but, would we make an agreeable

agreeable variety, it is necessary to consult the different shades or tints: how seldom, then, does it happen, that the mind, does not find itself, in similar circumstances? Very rare indeed! as in that consists, the whole art of writing.

Lest any one, under a false notion, that the richness of a language consists, in the plurality and abundance of words, should explode this system of mine, relative to the distinction of those, reputed synonymous; I must say, that though language is enriched by an abundance of words, yet, that abundance is not merely numeral; which is fit for nothing; but, as it were, to fill the coffers of a miser; but, such as springs from diversity, like that, which is observed, in the various productions of nature. It is the satisfaction of the mind, and, not the tickling of the ear, which is the object of all conversation
and

and writing; for which reason, the quantity of words, is not so much to be esteemed, as their quality. If they vary, only, from each other in their sounds, and, not in their greater or less degrees of energy, comprehension, precision, &c. they, in my opinion, serve more to burthen the memory, than, enrich or facilitate the art of speech. To stand up for a number of words, without any regard to their sense, is, confounding abundance, with superfluity; such a taste, I cannot better compare, than, to that, of the master of a feast, who should think the magnificence of an entertainment, consisted more, in the number of dishes, than, of eatables. Where is the great utility in having many terms to express one single idea? Is there not more advantage in having proper expressions for every idea we can form?

It

It will be in vain for Pleonasm, to alledge in its defence, that by this abundance, we avoid the bad effects of repetition; for, we are deceived with respect to the cause of that effect; it is not the repeating of the same sound, that offends so much, as the repetition of the same idea. If the same word displeases, when used a second time, it is not, because it hath already struck the ear; but, because it hath, before, affected the mind, which grows weary, and, is disgusted, without the graces of novelty. Hence, came the establishment of certain words, we call Pronouns; the repetition of which, custom hath made familiar, having given them no other office, than, simply, to recal the matter in question, without any redundancy of words. For the same reason, what we call Articles, and, Prepositions, are, equally, repeated without disgust; nothing being expected

pected from them, but, a bare nomination or indication; for having nothing to determine of themselves, they, always, appear new, when the subject they indicate, is new. This is an undeniable proof that the beauty of words, is more owing to their variety of meanings, than, to their different articulations; and, that 'tis a multiplicity of ideas, that produces, in effect, a multiplicity of terms. If any one, yet, doubts this, he has nothing to do, but to examine them a little closer, and, be a little nicer in his choice; or, without giving himself the trouble of such examination, let him peruse, only, with attention, the reflections here, laid before him; for, be the remarks, either just or not, they will, plainly, shew, that, there are no words, so perfectly, synonymous, as, to signify, exactly, the same, upon all occasions; consequently, they admit of a particular nicety
in

in choice. It is this choice, the following sheets endeavour to determine, by definitions, and, examples, which distinguish, and, disclose the proper character of these words; in which, it is hoped, they will, in some measure, succeed.

With respect to the work itself, it may be said, without, either, vanity or affected modesty, that, it is copied from no one; neither was there any one to copy; if it, therefore, merits nothing, from the manner of its execution; it will, at least, from its novelty: to this may be added that of variety; for, almost, every page, contains something differing from, and, independent of, that, which goes before, or, follows after, although of the same sort. Never book was, at the same time, more uniform, and, more diversified: its perusal needs not be, either, continued or regular; let the reader open it, where he
will,

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will, he cannot fail of finding something, and, that, entire; which will, at least, satisfy his curiosity, if not content his understanding: it will serve as well, to amuse a quarter of an hour, as, employ a whole day: and, may be taken up, and, laid aside, at any time.



T H E



THE
AUTHOR'S
P R E F A C E.

AFTER giving the Reader, a translation of *Girard's* Preface, it will be unnecessary, to say more, relative to the *usefulness*, of the work, than, that, as a great *inattention* to the beauties of language, is general, almost, in *every* country; a volume or two, of *this* kind, must be, *equally*, acceptable *here*, as in *France*; and, it is hoped, the great esteem, the *Abbé* acquired by
his

his piece, and, the many editions, *that* has run through, are *sufficient* proofs of its *excellence*, and, will be *some* excuse, for *this* similar attempt. As much of the *French* treatise, as would agree with the *English* mode of expression, is translated and adapted to it; and, if such translation, be found, in no respect, *uniform*; it must be attributed to *impossibility*. Should any one imagine, because some words, which are here classed, as *passing* for *synonymous*, do not, *immediately*, strike the mind, as *such*; that, labouring at a *distinction*, was unnecessary and useless; if he cannot recollect a passage, where he has *seen*, or, call to mind, that he has, at any time, *heard*, them *indiscriminately* used; let him cast his eye, over the *folio* edition, of *Johnson's* dictionary, and he will, *instantly*, discover that these endeavours, though, *inadequate* to the task, have not been,

wholly,





THE
SIGNIFICATION
OF
WORDS, ESTEEMED SYNONYMOUS,
IN THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
INVESTIGATED.

I.

To *Abandon*
Forsake,
Leave,

To *Relinquish,*
Desert,
Quit.

THE words *abandon* and *leave* imply involuntary acts; the words *forsake*, *relinquish* and *desert*, those that are voluntary.

To *abandon*, is more applicable to things; *leave*, to persons. He was under a necessity of *abandoning* his possessions, and compelled to *leave* his friends.

B

To

To *forsake*, implies leaving in resentment or dislike; to *relinquish*, quitting any claim to; to *desert*, leaving meanly or treacherously.

Being treated with disrespect, we are apt to *forsake* even the person, whose cause we were studious to espouse. Every honest man, finding his plea not backed by justice, would readily *relinquish* his claim, and even make his competitor a recompence adequate to the expence and trouble he had put him to. It is an act of the greatest baseness to *desert* one's friend in time of distress.

To *quit*, implies the breaking off from, and may be either voluntary or involuntary.

When he had acquired by trade sufficient to support himself, for the remainder of his life, he, prudently, *quitted* his business. Being overpowered, by superior strength, he was obliged to *quit* his hold.

We should by no means *abandon*, while we can keep possession; nor *leave*, while we are able to stay; we should not *forsake*, without sufficient reason; nor are we bound to *relinquish*, but when our title is bad: No colour of excuse can be alledged for *desertion*; nor should we ever *quit*, with a view of laying hold again.

.2.

To *Abdicate*,
Renounce,
Resign.

To *abdicate* is an involuntary act; *renounce* and *resign* are voluntary.

Abdicate



Abdicate more particularly relates to a throne ; *renounce*, to matters of religion ; *resign*, to employments.

King James the second *abdicated* the throne of England, when he could keep possession of it no longer. Many persons, through conviction of mind, have formally *renounced* the errors of the church of Rome. We frequently *resign* our employments, through a desire of retirement.

To *abdicate* a crown, is ever looked upon as disgraceful ; to *renounce* a religion, as honourable, when done through the prevalence of truth ; and to *resign* an office, as noble, when generously given up in favour of another, and with the approbation of the person we serve.

3.

To *Abate*,
Diminish,

To *Decrease*,
Lessen.

These words are nearly synonymous, when they are verbs neuter ; they, then, mean to grow less : as verbs active, they are very different. Even as neuters, they will carry some difference in their meaning.

To *abate*, implies a decrease in action ; *diminish*, a waste in substance ; *decrease*, a decay in moral virtue ; *lessen*, a contraction of parts.

Want of spirits, when a man is running, will *abate* his ardour, and, consequently, his pace. Febrifuges, if properly applied, will *abate* a fever. Put sugar into water, and it will *diminish* visibly. An object, seemingly, *diminishes*, in proportion to the distance, from which, we view it.

Through a contempt of religion, men, daily, *decrease* in virtue. A *decrease* in piety, is usually accompanied with false notions of God. Draw the air from a blown-up bladder, and it *lessens*, proportionably.

As verbs active; to *abate*, more particularly, implies, to lower in the price of; *diminish*, to make less by abscision or destruction, either with respect to bulk, value, quality or quantity; *lessen*, to a voluntary act of degradation.

Shop-keepers, generally, ask their customers an advanced price for goods, that they may be enabled to *abate*, if desired.

By dividing of substance, we *diminish* its bulk; by breaking a diamond, we *diminish* its value; by mixing water with spirits, we *diminish* the quality; and by taking one yard from ten, we *diminish* the quantity.

A mean action always *lessens* us, in the sight of good men; and whatever false notions vanity may inculcate, we ever seem *less*, when we strive to appear greater.

4.

To *Abhor*,
Hate,

| To *Loath*,
Detest.

All these words imply aversion, but require to be differently used, upon different occasions.

To *abhor*, implies an aversion to that, to which, we have a natural antipathy; *hate*, an aversion actuated by revenge: *loath*, is more applicable to food: *detest*, implies aversion actuated by disapprobation.

We

We *abhor*, what we cannot endure. ' We are apt to *hate* the person, who injures us. We *loath* the food, by which we have been surfeited. We *detest* the man, who is guilty of a mean action.

The spendthrift, naturally, *abhors* niggardliness, and the niggard, profligacy. The *hatred* of the revengeful man, is roused, whenever the object of his revenge approaches. The stomach *loaths* the very sight of that meat, by which we have been satiated. Every, thinking, man *detests* the least degree of meanness, more particularly that, which is sordid or base.

5.

<i>Abjeet,</i>		<i>Mean,</i>
<i>Low,</i>		<i>Beggarly.</i>

As the words *abjeet* and *low* are indiscriminately used, when meant to signify a person's state or condition; so are the words *mean* and *beggarly*, when we would express the disposition: but the impropriety of so doing, is very evident.

By *abjeet*, is understood that forlorn situation in life, that a man brings himself into, by ill conduct; by *low*, that, in which Providence has placed him: the first, is voluntary; the latter, involuntary.

Divine Wisdom hath thought proper, for various reasons, to make distinctions between men, placing some, in a higher sphere, others, in a *lower*; but never was he the cause of any one's *abjectness*. Want of merit or fortune, often, renerds

renders a man *low*; but it must be a villainous character, to make him *abject*.

With respect to the words *mean* and *beggarly*, when meant to express the disposition, the absurdity of using them, one for the other, is, equally, visible.

Mean, signifies a man's readiness to perform a dirty or illicit action; whereas *beggarly*, is, more particularly, expressive of a narrow, groveling spirit.

He who can stoop, to be guilty of a *meanness*, merits the contempt of all who know him. It has, ever, been accounted *beggarly*, to live below the rank of life we are in.

When a man is brought into a state of penury and contempt, by a long course of infamy, we, justly, call him *abject*; if his narrow circumstances are, only, owing to the poverty of his parents, we, then, repute him *low*; when guilty of any thing, beneath the character of an honest man, or a gentleman, we account him *mean*; and when the treasures of the rich, are sullied by the narrow notions of the poor, we call it *beggarly*.

6.

To *Abolish*,
Abrogate,
Disannul,

To *Repeal*,
Revoke.

Abolish, is a term, rather to be used with respect to customs; *abrogate* and *repeal*, with regard to laws; *disannul* and *revoke*, to private contracts.

When

When old customs have been, by long experience, found to be detrimental, they have, very prudently, been *abolished*. New fashions, *abolish* old ones

The word *abrogate*, is generally used with respect to ancient laws; *repeal*, to modern; that is, when we talk of rendering old laws null, we call it *abrogating*; when those lately made, *repealing*.

Despotic power has frequently *abrogated* what was instituted by equity. Upon the enactment of a new law, many inconveniences have sometimes appeared, before unthought of; this, has occasioned a *repeal*.

The *abrogation* of a fundamental law, frequently causes the ruin of the sovereign, or of the people; and, sometimes, of both. The legislative power has often found itself obliged to *repeal* an act of parliament one session, which passed the last; merely, to appease the clamours of the people.

The difference in meaning, between the words *disannul* and *revoke*, is not very great; yet such as to admit of a distinction.

Disannul is applied to a written contract; *revoke* to a verbal.

He, who gives a conditional bond to another, has a right to *disannul* it, if the specified conditions are not punctually observed. To *revoke* a promise now-a-days, is no other, than fashionable; whereas, formerly, it was considered, as a breach of friendship.

7.

To *Finish*,
Complete,

|

To *End*,
Conclude.

With respect to the three first words, the proper idea of *finishing*, is, the bringing a thing to its last period : the *completion* of any thing, is, the actual arrival of that last period : and the characteristic of *ending*, is cessation or discontinuation.

Lazy people begin many things, without *finishing* any. We ever feel a secret satisfaction, in the *completion* of a work, we have been long about. May we not question the wisdom of those laws, which, instead of *ending* suits, do but serve, to prolong them ?

By the word *conclude*, we understand, performing the last act of ratiocination ; widely differing from *complete*. We *complete* a piece of mechanism ; but *conclude* an oration.

A piece of clockwork is of little value, till *completed*. It is allowed by all Rhetoricians, that the greatest ornament of an harangue, is a well finished *conclusion*.

We *finish* what we have begun, by continuing to work at it. We *complete* a work, by putting the last hand to it. We *end* it, by discontinuation. Thus, we may *finish*, without *ending* ; and *end*, without *completing*.

8.

On,
Upon,

These two words are indiscriminately used, one for another, on all occasions; but, with great impropriety.

On, rather, signifies by; as, *on* my word; *on* my honour; &c. whereas, *upon*, means up, on the top of; and is applied to matter; as, *upon* the table; *upon* the chair; *upon* the house; &c.

The absurdity of a contrary diction, is evident from the following change of words: it was his honour, *upon* which, he swore.

Indeed, the word *upon* is used with elegance, even detached from substance, when the sense is figurative; as for instance, he relied *upon* the promise of his friend; intimating, that, that promise, was the staff, *upon* which, he leaned: but, on other occasions, the impropriety is gross.

9.

Action,
Act,
Deed.

As custom has applied the word *deed*, chiefly to signify the written evidence of any legal act, it will be necessary, only, to shew the difference, between the words *action* and *act*.

The word *action*, then, is applicable, indifferently, to every thing we do, whether common

or extraordinary ; but the word *act*, should signify, something done, which is remarkable.

An elegant speaker, will not say, a *virtuous act*, a *good* or a *vitious act* ; but an *act of virtue*, or of *goodness*, or of *iniquity* : whereas, to say, a *virtuous action*, or a *good* or *vitious action*, is proper and elegant.

'Tis, generally, speaking, a good *action* to conceal the faults of our neighbours ; and it is the rarest *act* of charity, among mankind.

The sentiments of the heart, are not, so much, to be judged of, from words, as from *actions*. It is an *act*, of great heroïsm, to pardon our enemies, when we have power, to be revenged on them.

These two words are further distinguishable by our considering them, somewhat physically. The word *action*, in this light, relates, more, to the power that acts ; and the word *act*, is, more, applicable to the effect itself, produced by that power ; this makes the one, properly, the attribute of the other : so, that it may be, justly, said, we should always have a presence of mind, attendant upon our *actions*, to render, all of them, either *acts*, of bounty, or *acts* of justice.

IO.

To *Enlarge*,
Increase.

The word *enlarge*, is, properly, used to signify an addition of extent. *Increase*, is critically, applicable, only, to number, height and quantity.

We

We *enlarge* a town ; a field ; a garden. We *increase* the inhabitants of a town ; our expences ; our revenues.

The former word, is, more, suitable to one entire and vast quantity of space ; the latter, to any gross and multiplied quantity in general : thus, it is, commonly, said, that we have *enlarged* our house, when we have made it more extensive, by adding buildings to the sides of it : but, we, usually, say, a house is *increased* with an additional story, or with several new rooms.

By *enlarging* our territory, we, generally, *increase* our riches. Princes, certainly, *enlarge* their renown, by widening the bounds of their dominions ; and they are apt to think, they, at the same time, *increase* their power : but, in this, they are, sometimes, mistaken ; for such an *enlargement*, may chance to produce, only, an, *increase* of cares and troubles, which may end, in their utter ruin.

A king, who labours, more, after acquiring new subjects, than, in governing those he already has, may *enlarge* his fame ; but will never *increase* his happiness.

II.

Address,
Air,
Mien,
Behaviour,

Manners,
Deportment,
Carriage.

What is called our *air*, *mien* and *carriage*, seem to be born with us, and strike at first sight : our *addresses*, *manners*, *behaviour* and *deportment*,
are

are owing to education; and, gradually, disclose themselves, in our intercourse with the world.

Mien, rather, relates, to our look; *carriage* to our frame; but, the word *air* to both. We, usually, judge of the *mien*, by the face; the *carriage*, by the person; and the *air*, by both.

How sweet is the *mien*, that has good humour in the countenance! A gentleman, though in rags, is, easily, discovered, by his graceful *carriage*. An open countenance and majesty of person, give a man, the most engaging *air* imaginable.

Address, is confined to our words; *deportment*, to our actions: *behaviour* arises from both; and the fruit of *behaviour*, is *manners*.

Our *address* shall often please, when our *deportment* shall disgust; and VICE VERSA.

When our *address* is engaging, and our *deportment* comformable, 'tis impossible our *behaviour* should be otherwise.

In order, to be well with the world, we should suit our *behaviour*, to our company; which, though in the eye of some persons, has been considered, as deceitful, must, in the end, be looked upon, as the height of good *manners*.

An engaging *air*, which is the union of a charming *mien* and graceful *carriage*, is necessary, to make any thing please; but unless accompanied with good *manners*, arising from a genteel *address* and *deportment*, it becomes, perfectly, disgusting.

12.

To *Accost*,
Approach.

We *accost* those, with whom, we would speak ; but, often, *approach*, without any intention to *address*.

The bold, can *accost*, without the least hesitation. We cannot *approach* the great, without some kind of ceremony.

When we have any thing to say to a person, we, naturally, *accost* him : when we would insinuate ourselves into his good graces, we endeavour to *approach* him.

Education teaches us to *accost* the ladies with civility ; but, to *approach* them, requires some kind of assurance, seasoned with respect.

13.

Ingenuity,
Cleverness,

|

Abilities,
Parts.

Ingenuity, relates, more, to the invention of things ; *cleverness*, to the manner of executing them ; *ability*, to the actual execution of them ; and *parts*, to the discernment. The third, then, puts in use, what the second dictates, pursuant to the digested plan, of the fourth, invented by the first.

A man may be *ingenious*, and not *clever* ; he may be *clever*, without *abilities* to execute ; and
he

he may have great *abilities*, and, yet, not be a man of *parts*.

Admitting we are not very *ingenious*, still, if we are accustomed to the management of things, we may be *clever*; but it requires *abilities*, to do with them, as we would; and *parts*, to conduct them.

He, who discovered the powers of refraction and reflection, had he known nothing more, would have been *ingenious*: he, who constructed the telescope, was *clever*; the finisher, was a man of *abilities*; and without doubt, the philosopher, he, who applies the instrument to the various purposes of astronomy, must be a man of *parts*.

14.

To *Add*.

Augment.

By *adding* one thing to another, we *augment* the same. By the word *adding*, we understand, the joining of different things together; or, if they are things of the same kind, joining them, in such a manner, as not to confound them, but, that after such junction, each, may be distinguished from the other; whereas, the word *augment*, indicates our making a thing larger or more abundant, by such an addition, as shall cause it, afterwards, to appear one, and the same thing; or, at least, that, when the addition is made, the whole, together, shall be conceived under one idea; thus, for example, we *add* one basket of rubbish, to another, one room to another, but we *augment* the heap, and the house.

There

There are many, who would not scruple to *augment* their own stock, by fraudulently *adding* to it, that of another.

To *add*, is a verb active only; *augment*, both active and neuter.

Our ambition, *augments* with our fortune; and we are no sooner in possession of one hundred pounds, than we are eager to *add* to it another.

15.

To Study,
Learn.

To *study*, implies a uniform application, in search of knowledge; to *learn*, that application, with success.

We *study*, to *learn*; and *learn*, by dint of *study*.

People of vivacity, *learn* easily; but are heavy at *study*.

We can *study* but one thing at a time; but we may *learn* many.

The more we *learn*, the more we know; but, oftentimes, the more we *study*, the less we know.

We have *studied* well, when we have *learned* to doubt.

There are many things we *learn*, without *study*; and other things we *study*, without *learning*.

Those are not the wisest, who have *studied* most; but, those who have *learnt* most.

We see some persons, *studying* continually, without *learning* any thing; and others, *learning* almost every thing, without the least *study*.

The time of our youth, is the time of *study*; but it is, in a more advanced age, when we, truly,
can

can be said, to *learn*; it is then, only, we have capacity to digest, what we have before, laid up in the memory.

16.

Buttress,
Support,
Prop.

The *Buttress*, fortifies; it is fixed close, to resist the impulsion of other bodies: the *support*, bears, by being placed beneath a thing, to prevent its falling under a weight: the *prop*, assists, and its general use is, to strengthen.

A wall is frequently made stronger, by *buttresses*: an arch is *supported*, by columns: a house, when in danger of falling, is kept up, by *props*.

That, which has received a violent thrust, or is much bulged, stands in need of a *buttress*; that, which is too heavy to carry itself, is in want of *supporters*; and that, which ought to stand upright, and cannot be made to do so of itself, must be *propped*.

In a figurative sense, *buttress* relates, more, to defence; *support*, to credit; and *prop*, to friendship.

The true Christian, seeks no *buttress*, against the malignity of men, but that of innocence and integrity; he makes work, the most solid *support* of his life; and looks upon implicit obedience to the decree of heaven, as the most steady *prop* of his felicity.

17. *Enough,*

17.

*Enough,
Sufficient.*

The object of both these words, is quantity; but with this difference, that *enough* relates, more, to the quantity, one desires to have, and *sufficient*, to that quantity, one, really, wants to employ.

Thus, the avaritious man never has *enough*; let him accumulate ever so much, he, still, desires more; and the prodigal, never *sufficient*; he, still, wanting to expend more than he has.

We say, we have *enough*, when we wish not for more: and we say, we have *sufficient*, when we have, just, what is necessary.

When applied to such things, as are consumable, the word *enough*, seems to denote, a much greater quantity, than the word *sufficient*; for in relation to such things, when we say we have *enough*, it seems, as though we should have too much, had we more: but, what we call *sufficient*, may be added to, without coming near that extreme: for, we may say, of a very small income or revenue, that it is *sufficient*; though, at the same time, we can hardly think it *enough*.

The word *enough*, has a more general and comprehensive meaning; the word *sufficient*, a more limited and particular one.

An hour at table, is, certainly, *sufficient*, for our nourishment; but, not *enough*, for some persons pleasure or satisfaction.

An œconomist, can find *enough*, where there is very little; but the prodigal, never has *sufficient*, let him have ever so much.

18.

To <i>Declare,</i>	To <i>Maintain,</i>
<i>Affirm,</i>	<i>Swear,</i>
<i>Protest,</i>	<i>Avouch,</i>
<i>Aver,</i>	<i>Attest.</i>
<i>Assert,</i>	

In the first seven words, we find different degrees of declaration. To *declare*, signifies, to tell any thing simply, but seriously; to *affirm*, means, to say confidently; to *protest*, implies a solemn affirmation; to *aver*, signifies, a positive declaration; to *assert*, that declaration, defended; to *maintain*, implies a support of such assertion; to *swear*, is, to ratify it, by an oath.

When we give our opinion, on being seriously asked, we are said, to *declare* it: when we would give that declaration, more force, we *affirm* it: and, to strengthen that affirmation, we *protest* it, solemnly; that is we *affirm* it, by invoking the Deity.

The other words, are, sufficiently, explained above.

If, ever, we wish, to gain credit, in the world, whatever we *declare*, should be backed by truth. True politeness, forbids our *affirming* any thing, unless required by the obligations of justice. To make frequent use of *protestations*, betrays a suspicion, that our bare word, is not to be believed. Always to *aver*, hath an appearance of dogmatizing; and *shews* us ignorant of that proper degree of diffidence, which ever accom-
panies

panies wisdom. Some persons are so ready to *assert*, that let the matter be right or wrong, 'tis equally the same. When our opinions are just, and well-grounded, we have an undoubted right, to *maintain* them. *Swearing*, was first instituted in courts of judicature, as a conscientious testimony of truth.

The words *avouch*, and *attest*, tho' often used as synonymous, with the foregoing; have a very different signification. The word, *avouch*, implies, an assertion, in defence of another; *attest*, a bearing witness to what another has, just before, said.

When the reputation of an honest man has been, undeservedly, hurt, 'tis the part of a friend, to *avouch* his good character.

Too much care to *attest* all that is advanced, renders our conversation tiresome.

There is another verb, *warrant*, which has some affinity to the word *maintain*; but, as custom has made the use of it vulgar, it is unnecessary to take any further notice of it.

19.

Arms,
Weapons.

By *arms*, we understand those instruments of offence, generally, made use of in war; such as, fire-arms, swords, &c. By *weapons*, we, more particularly, mean instruments of other kinds, (exclusive of fire-arms) made use of as offensive, on especial occasions.

In

In the state of Switzerland, all men are obliged to learn the use of *arms*, in their youth, that, in cases of extremity, they may be capable of defending themselves against the attacks of their enemies.

In times of insurrection, people make use of such *weapons* as they can get.

20.

Attractions,
Allurements,
Charms.

Besides the general idea, which makes these three words appear synonymous, it is, likewise, their common fate, scarce ever to be used in the singular number; at least, in those senses, in which, they are here considered; that is, whenever they are used to signify the power of beauty, of agreeableness, or, of any thing which pleases.

With respect to their different meanings, it appears to me, that *attractions* mean, something natural; *allurements*, somewhat, rather, artificial; and *charms*, somewhat stronger and more uncommon than either.

Attractions, may be said, to engage us; *allurements*, to entice us; *charms*, to seduce us.

The heart of man can scarce stand against the *attractions* of a pretty woman: It is with difficulty he can defend himself against the *allurements* of a *coquette*; but, to resist the *charms* of a sweet-tempered beauty, is impossible.

Ladies,

Ladies, always, owe their *attractions* and their *charms*, to a happy formation of their features and persons; but they, sometimes, procure their *allurements*, at their toilettes.

I know not whether I may fall in with the taste of mankind; but in my opinion, *attractions* rise from those ordinary graces, which nature has bestowed upon the women with more or less liberality, and which are the common appendages of the sex; *allurements*, from those cultivated graces, which form a faithful mirror of the natural, and are studied, merely, with a desire to please; *charms*, from those singular graces, which nature, sometimes, bestows as a most valuable gift, and which are more particular and personal.

Defects not seen at first, but afterwards observed, lessen *attractions* greatly. *Allurements* vanish, as soon as the artifice appears. *Charms* lose their force, when time and custom hath rendered them familiar.

These words are not in use only, with regard to beauty, and the graces of the sex; but, with respect to every thing that pleases. In this case, *attractions* and *charms*, are applied, only, to such things, as are amiable in themselves; whereas, the word *allurements*, is, sometimes, applied to such things, as are even in themselves odious; but, which we love nevertheless.

Virtue has *attractions*, which the most vicious of men cannot avoid being sensible of. The riches of the world are *allurements*, which never fail to captivate, in spite of their ill tendency. Pleasure has such *charms*, that it is hunted after by every one, as well by the philosopher, as the libertine.

We

We say, great *attractions*; powerful *allurements*; and, invincible *charms*.

Honour *attracts*; fortune *allures*; but, the *charms* of glory, are invincible.

21.

Miserly,
Niggardly,

Covetous,
Avaritious.

The word *miserly*, signifies, rather, a apriemious disposition, or a depriving ourselves of the necessities of life, merely to hoard the riches we possess. By *niggardly*, we understand, that fordid temper, that does things by halves. *Covetous*, implies, an eager craving for the possessions of another. By *avaritious*, we mean, that inordinate thirst of gain, that makes a man grasp at every thing he sees. Taking the words in these senses, which are undoubtedly the proper ones, we may be *covetous* and not *avaritious*, *niggardly* and not *miserly*.

He, who never gives any thing away, is justly, called *miserly*; he, who fails to bestow when necessary, or, when he bestows, gives too little, draws on himself the epithet of *niggardly*; he, who longs for the goods of another, is *covetous*; and he, who grasps at wealth by all means whatever, *avaritious*.

Of all extraordinary beings, there is no greater one than the *miser*, who punishes himself, and starves in the midst of plenty.

The *miser* is laughed at, but the *niggard* is despised.

The

The contented man is at quiet within himself ; but the *covetous* is ever on the rack : he eagerly wishes for what another possesses, and his inability of obtaining it, is his continual torment.

It is necessary to be ever watchful of an *avaritious* man, for his disposition leads him to take every opportunity of defrauding you.

22.

*Acknowledgement,
Confession.*

Acknowledgment, supposes a question asked ; whereas, *confession*, favours a little of self-accusation.

We *acknowledge* what we had an inclination to conceal : We *confess* that which we were blameable in doing.

It is interrogation, which causes *acknowledgment* ; repentance, *confession*.

It is better to make a sincere *acknowledgment*, than a bad excuse.

We should not *confess* to all sorts of people.

An *acknowledgment* unasked, is either noble or foolish, according to the circumstances, and effect it produces

Confession, unaccompanied with repentance, is an insult to the Deity.

It would be want of spirit, to *acknowledge* a fault, without a certainty that such *acknowledgment* would be satisfactory ; and it would be foolish, to make *confession*, without hopes of pardon ; for why should we declare ourselves culpable to those, who breathe nothing but vengeance.

23. *Admonition,*

23.

*Admonition,
Advice,
Counsel.*

The end of *admonition*, is gentle reproof. *Advice* and *counsel*, are to convey instruction; but with this difference, that *advice*, implies no superiority with respect either to rank or parts, in the person who gives it; whereas, *counsel*, generally, carries with it one, if not both.

Admonition, in a master, frequently has a greater effect than correction.

People are readier to give *advice*, than to take it.

Parents should take care to *counsel* their children, before they turn them out into the world.

Admonition should be given with temper. *Advice*, with sincerity, and *counsel*, with art and modesty.

Admonish a friend in private, but reward him openly.

Nothing is more salutary than good *advice*, and yet, nothing is more nauseous to take.

When *counsel* is given with an air of impertinence, it is sure to make the *counsel* despised, and the counsellor odious.

24.

To *Have*,
Possess.

In order to *have* a thing, it is not necessary to have the power of disposal of it, or to have it
actually

actually in our hands; it is sufficient that it belongs to us: but to *possess* it, it must be in our hands, and, we have the liberty of disposing of it, whenever we think proper.

Thus, we *have*, an estate, notwithstanding it is mortgaged for the benefit of our creditors; but, as to riches, we *possess* them.

We are not always masters, of what we *have*; we are, of what we *possess*.

A married man *has* continual torment, when the Demon of Jealousy *possesses* him.

We *have* often but the half of things, partaking them with others; we *possess* them, when they are entirely our own.

Those, who *have* only the knowledge of arts, follow their rules; but those, who *possess* them, lay down their rules to follow.

25.

Battle,
Combat,
Fight.

Battle, is an action, more general, and commonly, preceded by some preparation. *Combat*, seems to be an action, more particular, and often unexpected. *Fight* may be either one or the other, and is seldom used in the plural.

Thus, the *fight*, between the Carthaginians and the Romans, and that, at Pharsalia, between Cæsar and Pompey, were *battles*: but those, in
C which

which the Horatii and the Curatii, decided the fate of Rome, were *combats*.

26.

*Handsome,
Pretty,
Beautiful.*

It is the fate of these words, when applied to the female sex, to be used indiscriminately one for the other, and yet, at the same time, no three words can be more different,

By a *handsome* woman, we understand one, that is tall, graceful and well shaped, with a regular disposition of features: by a *pretty*, we mean one, that is delicately made, and whose features are so formed, as to please: by a *beautiful*, a union of both.

A lady may be *handsome* and not *pretty*, *pretty* and not *handsome*; but, to be *beautiful*, she must be both *pretty* and *handsome*.

Many a *handsome* woman has a forbidding countenance.

It has been the misfortune of many a *pretty* woman, to be crooked.

A *beautiful* woman, is, now-a-days, very rare to be met with.

Prettiness, carries an idea of simplicity; *handsomeness*, of nobility; *beauty*, of majesty.

The ladies, in romances, are described, as, either *beautiful* or *handsome*; the shepherdesses, by the poets, are represented as *pretty*; so, in other things, we say, a *beautiful* palace; a *handsome* house; a *pretty* cottage.

A beautiful

A *beautiful* woman, is an object of curiosity ; a *handsome* woman, of admiration ; and a *pretty* one, of love.

When applied to other things, *beautiful*, relates to something more serious and engaging ; *pretty*, to somewhat more gay and diverting ; this is the reason why we say a *beautiful* tragedy ; but, a *pretty* comedy.

27.

Benignity,
Benevolence,
Kindness,

Tenderness,
Humanity.

Benignity, is a sort of kind condescension, and an attribute of princes only. *Benevolence*, a wishing well to mankind, and seems relative to those, who have, more particularly, the power of doing good. *Kindness*, is the same disposition among equals. *Tenderness*, is a susceptibility of impression, and more applicable, to persons nearly connected. *Humanity*, denotes a fellow feeling, for the distressed, even, of a stranger.

Benignity, *benevolence*, and *kindness*, spring from the will ; *tenderness*, and *humanity*, from the heart.

The *benignity* of a prince, makes him universally beloved by his subjects.

Benevolence, is a shining character, and is more conspicuous, for the charitable actions it produces.

Kindness, is what one man naturally expects from another, and what we are reciprocally bound to impart.

The *tenderness* of a parent, has, often, been the ruin of a child.

The distresses of individuals, will, often, draw tears from a person, truly *humane*.

From the very instant of our birth, we experience the *benignity* of heaven, and malignity of corrupt nature.

The realized *benevolence*, of some good men, have, almost, made them worshipped by their fellow creatures.

Kindnesses, are in the power of every one to shew; therefore, he, that withholds them, favours more of the brute, than of the man.

The great *tenderness* of animals, to their young, is a standing reproof to the many unfeeling mothers.

True *humanity* consists, in not treating with rigour, but excusing the weaknesses, supplying the defects, assuaging the pains, and comforting the afflictions, of our neighbour.

28.

Poverty,
Indigence,
Want,

Need,
Necessity.

Poverty, is that situation of fortune, opposed to riches, in which, we are deprived of the conveniences of life.

Indigence, is a degree lower; we there want the necessaries; and is opposed to superfluity.

Want, seems rather to arrive by accident, implies, a scarcity of provisions, rather than a lack of money, and is opposed, to abundance.

Need

Need and *necessity* relate less to the situation of life, than the other three words, but more to the relief we expect, or the remedy we seek ; with this difference between the two, that *need*, seems less pressing than *necessity*.

Merit, or a fortunate circumstance, in life, frequently extricates us from a state of *poverty*, in which we were born ; and in which, prodigality often plunges the rich.

Diligence is the best remedy against *indigence*, which is, generally, the just punishment of idleness.

Wise precautions prevent *want*, which is often brought on, by extravagance.

When we are in *need*, we should seek assistance from our friends, but be careful not to importune too much.

The means of obtaining relief, in extreme *necessity*, is to implore the succour of the truly charitable.

A state of *poverty*, is most conducive to the health of the soul ; we being there, out of the way of temptations.

The man, who opens his hand to the cravings of the *indigent*, feels within his breast a secret satisfaction, which the uncharitable man, is an entire stranger to.

He that will waste, will *want*.

A friend in *need*, is a friend indeed.

Necessity, is the mother of invention.

29.

*Good-fortune,
Prosperity.*

What we call *good-fortune*, is the effect of chance ; it comes unexpected. *Prosperity*, is the success of conduct ; and comes by degrees.

Fools have, sometimes, *good-fortune* : wise men do not, always, *prosper*.

The Capitol, that was saved by the cackling of geese, and not by the vigilance of the centinels, is a piece of history, more proper, to shew the *good-fortune*, of the Romans, than their military government on that occasion ; though, on all others, their wise conduct, has contributed as much to their *prosperity*, as the valour of their soldiers.

30.

*Good-nature,
Good-humour.*

These terms, though very expressive of their respective meanings, are too often, for want of proper discernment, confounded.

We may be *good-humoured*, and not *good-natured* ; *good-natured*, and yet not, always, *good-humoured*.

To make this properly appear, it is necessary to give a full definition of each.

By *good-nature*, is meant, that disposition, which partakes the felicity of all mankind ;
that

that promotes the satisfaction of every individual, within the reach of its ability ; that relieves the distressed, comforts the afflicted, diffuses blessings, and communicates happiness, as far as its sphere of action can extend ; whereas, *good-humour* is nothing more, than a chearful, pleasing deportment, arising, either from a natural gaiety of mind, or, an affectation of popularity, joined to an affability of behaviour, which is the result of good-breeding, and a compliance with the taste of every company.—This kind of *good-humour*, is by far, the most striking quality ; 'tis frequently mistaken for, and complimented with, the superior name of real *good-nature*. A man, by this specious appearance, has often acquired that appellation, who, in all the actions of his private life, has been a morose, cruel, revengeful, sullen, haughty tyrant. On the contrary, a man of a true benevolent disposition, and formed, to promote the happiness of all around him, may sometimes, perhaps, from an ill habit of body, an accidental vexation, or a commendable openness of heart, above the meanness of disguise, be guilty of little sallies of peevishness or *ill-humour*, that may carry the appearance of, and be, unjustly, thought to proceed from, *ill-nature*, by persons who are not acquainted with his true character ; and, who take them for synonymous terms, tho', in reality, they have not the least analogy to each other.

31.

Happiness,
Felicity,
Bliss.

These three words denote, equally, an advantageous state, and agreeable situation ; but that of *happiness*, marks, properly, the state of fortune, capable of dispensing pleasures, and placing them within our reach ; that of *felicity*, expresses, particularly, the state of the heart ; disposed to taste pleasure, which it finds, in whatsoever it possesses ; that of *bliss*, which conveys a mystic idea, paints a state of imagination, which we anticipate, as it were, from a thorough conviction that we shall inherit it hereafter.

Our *happiness* glares in the eyes of the world, and exposes us, often, to envy. Our *felicity* is known only to ourselves, and gives us continual satisfaction. The idea of *bliss*, extends itself beyond a life temporal.

We are sometimes in a state of *happiness*, without being in a state of *felicity*. *Happiness* consists in the possession of wealth, honours, friends and health ; but 'tis the satisfaction of the mind, and the enjoyment of those things, that constitutes *felicity*. As to *bliss*, it is the portion of the godly, and depends in each religion, on the persuasion of the mind.

Satisfaction without, forms the *happiness* of man ; satisfaction within, his *felicity* : *bliss* must be asked of God. The first, is within the reach of riches, the second, of wisdom, but, the
 third,

third, is reserved for those, whom the scripture calls, the poor in spirit.

32.

Confines,
Limits,
Bounds.

Confines, are where we are at liberty to go. *Limits*, are what we ought, not to pass. *Bounds*, are what we cannot pass.

We approach, or, get farther from the *confines*; we contract, or, extend the *limits*; we advance, or, remove the *bounds*.

By *confines*, we rather understand, the edge or border: the *confines* of a country, not surrounded by the sea, are generally distinguished by rivers or hills.

He, who continually exceeds the *limits*, which temperance hath set, will soon find himself, on the *confines* of the grave.

They say, with more eloquence than truth, that the *limits* of the Roman empire, were those of the world.

The Sea, the Alps, and the Pirenean mountains, are the natural *bounds* of France.

Ambition knows no *bounds*; and we are never happy but when the *bounds* of our fortune, are those of our desire.

33.

*Extremity,
End.*

Each, of these words, signifies, the last of those parts which constitutes a thing; but with this difference, that *extremity*, supposes a situation and an arrangement, intimating the greatest distance; whereas, *end*, supposes a length only, and denotes, that place where the length ceases.

Extremity, answers to the centre; *end*, to the beginning; thus, we say, the *extremity* of a kingdom; the *end* of life.

34.

*Aim,
View,
Design.*

The *aim*, is more fixed, we take every method to pursue it; the *view*, more vague, we make use of means to accomplish it; the *design*, more close, we leave nothing undone to complete it.

A good prince has no other *design* in his government, than to render his state flourishing, because, he has the happiness of his people, in *view*, and true glory, is his *aim*.

The true Christian has no other *aim*, than heaven; no other *view*, than to please God; nor any other *design* to complete, than his own salvation.

We

We are said, to lay an *aim*; to have *views*; to form a *design*.

Reason forbids our laying any *aim*, that is impossible to attain; to *have* any chimerical *views*, or to form any *design* we are unable to execute.

If my *views* are just, I have a *design* in my head, that will bring me to my *aim*.

35.

Burden,
Load.

By the word, *burden*, we understand, a weight, possible to be borne; by *load*, a weight, more than we are able to bear.

A light *burthen*, is no inelegant expression; but, a light *load*, certainly is.

In the heat of summer, our very cloaths, are a *burthen*.

Many a poor animal is so inhumanly laden, as to sink under the *load*.

Taken now in a figurative sense, they are, equally, different.

How unhappy is the man, who feels the *burthen* of an evil conscience!

We have, sometimes, thro' a bad habit of body, such a *load* upon our spirits, as not to be able to support ourselves.

36.

*Charm,
Enchantment,
Spell.*

The word *charm*, carries an idea of force, which puts a stop to ordinary effects and natural causes. The word *enchantment*, is used, properly, for that which regards the illusion of the senses. The word *spell*, bears particularly an idea of something, which disturbs the reason. All the three, in the literal sense, mark the effect of a magical operation, condemned by religion, and laughed at by philosophy.

Antiquated tales, say there is a *charm* to destroy the effect of arms, and make them invulnerable. We read, in old romances, of the surprising power of *enchantments*, that have, suddenly, changed the manners, and reversed the fortune. Weak people have thought, and do still believe, that by means of a *spell*, the health has been destroyed, and the person so bewitched, made raving mad; but, persons, of good sense, see no *charm* in the world, but the caprice of passions, with respect to reason, which often suspends reflection, and stops the effects, which that would naturally and necessarily produce: they are acquainted with no other *enchantment*, than, that seduction arising from a depraved taste, and disordered imagination: they know also, that, which is foolishly attributed to the power of a *spell*, maliciously laid, is no other, than the effect of a bad constitution, which is frequently remedied, by an application of proper medicines.

37. To

37.

To *Chastise*,
Punish,

To *Correct*,
Discipline.

We *chastise*, him, who has committed a fault; to prevent his doing the same again: we *punish*, the person guilty of a crime, by way of expiation, and, as an example to others. To *correct*, signifies, to amend, by means of *chastisement*; to *discipline*, means, to regulate and instruct.

We *chastise* a child, in order to *correct* his manners: officers are, frequently, obliged to *punish* a soldier with death, to keep up good *discipline* in the regiment.

It is necessary, for good *correction*, that the *chastisement*, be not the effect of anger: justice demands, that the *punishment* be rigorous, when the crime is enormous; otherwise, there can be no good *discipline* in the state.

God, like a tender father, *chastises* us in this life, that we may not be *punished* in the life to come.

As the words *chastise*, and, *punish*, are thought to have the nearest affinity to each other; it may not be unnecessary, to shew a yet further difference between them.

Chastise, then, carries, always, with it an idea of subordination; denoting, an authority or superiority in him, who *chastises*, over the person, *chastised*; but the word, *punishment*, carries no such idea, in its signification; for we are sometimes *punished*, by our equals, by ourselves, by our inferiors, by the mere event of things, or, by the effects of the fault, we have committed.

Parents,

Parents, who, thro' tenderness to their children, forbear to *chastise* them, are often *punished* for their folly, by their future ingratitude and ill conduct.

38.

Prudence,
Discretion,

| *Care,*
Caution.

Prudence, is here the mother virtue, and signifies wisdom applied to practice: *discretion*, is the effect of prudence, and means, a knowledge to govern or direct one's self: By *care*, we understand, heed, in order to preservation. *Caution*, implies, a greater degree of wariness.

A proper attention to *prudence*, would make us so *discreet*, as to be *careful*, in every thing we do; and cause us to act, with the greatest *caution*.

A hasty conduct, can never be called *prudent*: want of attention, in affairs of moment, is the greatest height of *indiscretion*; for without that necessary qualification, 'tis impossible any thing we do, can be attended with success: He who expects to do any thing well, must act with *care*; and he, who is desirous of avoiding difficulties, with *caution*.

To weigh matters well, before we put them into execution, is a mark of *prudence*.

A *discreet* man, in the company of dangerous persons, such as would take advantage of his words, would be *careful*, how he opened his mouth, and, would utter nothing, but with the greatest *caution*.

39. *Circumspection,*

39.

*Circumspection,
Consideration,
Regard.*

A proper attention, to the manner of acting, and, conducting ourselves, in our commerce with the world, with respect to others; contributing rather to their satisfaction, than our own, is the common and general idea, which these three words present, at first sight: notwithstanding which, it appears to me, that their application should be different.

Circumspection, principally, takes place in discourse; it prevents our letting any thing escape us, that may do hurt, or give offence; and, is the effect of prudence, which risks nothing. *Consideration*, is more personal, and relates, particularly, to our manner of treating other people, making a proper distinction, as different opportunities may offer; and, is the consequence of esteem and duty. *Regard*, relates more to the state, or, situation of persons; being, particularly, careful to omit nothing, which good sense and politeness require; and, is the fruit of a good education.

To be well with the world, requires *circumspection*, when we are speaking before those, with whom, we are not acquainted; *consideration*, for people of rank and quality; and, *regard*, towards those, with whom, we are interested.

We ought to have a great deal of *circumspection*, in conversations of religion and government; because, they are public matters, and, subjects, on
which

which particulars are not, at liberty, to say, what they think, especially, if their thoughts are in opposition to those established in the country, where they are. It is not adviseable, for our interests, to omit shewing marks of *consideration*, to such persons, whose assistance we may stand in need of, and, from whom, we hope to receive any service. We cannot have too great a *regard* for the ladies; it is what they expect, and are displeased if we neglect.

40.

Cunning,
Finesse,
Device,

|

Artifice,
Trick,
Stratagem.

Cunning, is the art of conducting designs, in a manner proper to succeed. *Finesse*, is a French word, lately adopted by the English, and means, an acting secretly and under cover. *Device*, is rather a pretty thought or contrivance. *Artifice*, is unnatural, and a far-fetched mean, of executing designs. *Trick*, which eludes the senses, implies, a juggle: and *stratagem*, denotes, a disguised way of obtaining our ends.

The first three of these words, are oftner understood in a good sense, than the other.

Cunning, is employed in using means; *finesse*, insinuates insensibly, and must be accompanied by penetration; *device*, surprises, and, gives satisfaction; *artifice*, generally, makes use of studied dissimulation; a *trick*, is, commonly, looked on as a fraud, and a *stratagem*, is oftener illicit, than otherwise.

Without

Without some degree of *cunning*, it will be impossible to deal with, or, guard against, the generality of mankind.

Finesse, is so essential to the courtier, that, without it, he is seen through presently.

Pretty *devices*, declare the authors of them, persons of ingenuity.

We ought particularly to guard against a man, who makes use of a great deal of *artifice*.

Jugglers perform *tricks*, to divert, and consequently, if clever, deserve applause; but he who *tricks* his neighbour, in order to serve himself, is a rogue.

All *stratagems*, in war, are lawful; but, in other cases, they are ever considered as derogatory to the character of an honest man.

41.

Moment,
Instant.

A *moment*, is not long; but, an *instant*, is still shorter. The word *moment*, has a signification, more extended; it is taken sometimes, for time, in general; and, is used in a figurative sense: that, of *instant*, is more contracted; it marks the shortest duration of time, and, is never used, but in the literal sense.

All depends upon knowing the favourable *moment*; sometimes, an *instant*, too soon, or, too late, is all, that makes the difference between success and misfortune.

Let us banish thought, as much as in our power, still, now and then, a reflective moment will intrude.

intrude. The face of things, which we have thought established, have been, frequently, changed in an *instant*.

Every *moment* is dear to one, who knows the value of time. Every *instant* of our life, is a step nearer the grave.

42.

Customs,
Manners,
Fashions.

Customs, relate to the general practice of the people; *manners*, to their way of life; and, *fashions*, to their dress.

There cannot be a more ridiculous *custom*, than that, of persons complimenting each other, in time of divine service; it being supposed, they have there, more material things to engross their attention.

An increase, or, decrease of luxury, has been found to have, more or less, influence on the *manners* of the people.

It has been observed, that there is a continual round of *fashions*; when the new are worn out, they, then, have recourse to the old, and those old ones, become new.

43.

To *Be*,
Exist,
Subsist.

Be, agrees with all sorts of subjects, substances or modes; with all manner of beings, real or ideal: *Exist*, is used, only, with respect to substances, and those, real: *Subsist*, is applied, equally, to substances or modes, but with reverence to the duration of their being, which is not expressed by the other two words.

We say, of qualities, forms, actions, motions, and, of all their different relations, that, they *are*; we say, of matter, spirit, bodies, and, all real beings, that, they *exist*: We say, of states, works, affairs, laws, and, all establishments, which are neither destroyed or changed, that, they *subsist*.

The verb, *be*, is commonly, used to mark the event of any modification or quality, in the subject: that, of *exist*, is in use, only, to express the end of simple existence: and we employ *subsist*, to point out the duration of that existence or modification. Thus, we say, that man *is* inconstant; that the phoenix *exists* not; that all human establishments *subsist*, but for a time.

44.

Famous,
Illustrious,

|

Celebrated,
Renowned.

Each of these qualities, distinguishes the reputation ; but that, which the word *famous* expresses, means, no more than a simple distinction of one country or age, above another, let that distinction be taken either in good part or bad. That, which the word *illustrious* expresses, is founded upon a merit, supported by dignity and glory ; which makes the object, not only known, but admired, and ranked among the great. That, which we understand, by the word, *celebrated*, expresses a superior degree of talents, with respect either to abilities or knowledge ; tho' it raises not the object, to an equal degree of grandeur, with the *illustrious*, it is, nevertheless, honourable. That, which the word, *renowned*, denotes, is founded, only, upon fashion or public taste ; which, without casting much honour on the subject, draws it simply from oblivion, and makes its name known to the world.

The maid of Orleans, cried down by the English, but, esteemed by the French, was, equally, *famous*, in both nations. Princes shine, during their life ; but, they are only *illustrious*, in future ages, by the monuments of grandeur, wisdom and greatness, which they leave behind them. There are *celebrated* authors, whose works, we cannot find fault with ; and, those, which we cannot even commend ; without risk-
ing

ing our own reputation. A man's fortune is half made, when once he becomes *renowned* in his profession.

Famous, *celebrated*, and, *renowned*, are equally, applicable to persons or things; but *illustrious*, to persons only; at least, when we would be nice in our choice of words.

Erostratus, among the Greeks, set fire to the temple of Diana, to make himself *famous*: he was rendered more so, by an order of the state, that his name should never after be mentioned, on pain of punishment. The greatest part of our libels, are of the same kind; they raise a dust and become *famous*, by being burnt by the hangman. The Duke of Marlborough became *illustrious*, by the many victories he obtained; his glorious actions are *celebrated* in history; so, are the many court-intrigues of the Dutchess. The Gobelins were so *renowned*, that their names live in the place, where they worked, and, in those works, in which, others imitate them. It is a question, whether the Phalernian wine was more *renowned*, than those are, of Champagne and Burgundy.

45.

Excuse,
Pardon,
Forgiveness.

We make *excuse*, for an apparent fault, or, slight offence: we ask *pardon*, for a real fault, or, when the offence is greater. We implore *forgiveness* of our sins. The first, is an apology,
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in order to justify ourselves, and, is founded on politeness; the second, is the mark of a good disposition, and, is done, in hopes of extenuation; the last, to avert the vengeance of God, and declares repentance.

The good mind, *excuses*, easily. The good heart, *pardons*, readily. God delights more in *forgiveness*, than in *revenge*.

Excuse, is more used, when we address ourselves to equals; *pardon*, to superiors; and, *forgiveness*, to heaven.

Good manners demand an *excuse* for that, which turns out wrong, let the intention be never so good. It can never be a degradation, to ask pardon of that person, whom we have offended; besides, the superior rank of some persons, makes it an absolute duty in the offender. How great is the presumption of that wretch, who fancies himself not in need of the *forgiveness* of the Almighty!

46.

*Duty,
Obligation.*

Duty, means, something conscientious, and, springs from a law; *obligation*, something absolute in practice, and, springs from custom.

We are said, to fail, in our *duty*; and, to dispense, with an *obligation*.

It is the *duty* of a clergyman, to carry himself modestly; and he is *obliged*, to wear dark coloured cloaths.

Policy

Policy finds less disadvantage, in neglecting her *duty*, than in forgetting the least of her *obligations*.

47.

To *Live*,
Dwell.

These two words are esteemed synonymous, in that sense, in which they signify residence; but *live*, relates to the particular place where, we inhabit; *dwell*, to the building, in which, we reside.

We *live*, in London; in Middlesex; in the country; we *dwell*, in a large house; a cottage; or, a furnished lodging.

When persons of distinction, *live* in London; they *dwell* in hovels, comparatively speaking, with their houses in the country.

We say, with great propriety, I *live*, all the summer, in the country; and, have one of the prettiest *dwellings* imaginable.

48.

To *Stay*,
Remain.

The common idea of these two words, is a cessation of progression; and their difference consists in this; that, to *stay*, seems to have less duration, than to *remain*.

A good

A good servant, when sent on a message, *stays* as short a time as possible.

When we have given offence, we should endeavour to make such an atonement, that the offended party may not *remain* dissatisfied.

The duration of time, expressed by the word, *stay*, seems less determinate, than that, by the word, *remain*.

Thus, we say, he *remained* at his country house a month; he *stay'd* longer, than we expected.

49.

Event,
Incident.

Event, is a word, most agreeable to states and governments; *incident*, to casualties in private life.

The revolutions of the state, are *events*, that determine the happiness of the people.

Our life is full of *incidents*, which, the eye of prudence cannot foresee.

50.

To *Awake,*
Awaken.

The first, of these words, is, more frequently used in a literal sense; the last, in a figurative.

The

The least noise *awakes* those, who sleep indifferently. It requires but little, to *awaken* a passion, which is not, entirely, rooted out from the heart.

50.

Heavy,
Weighty.

The word *heavy*, is more applicable to that, which loads the body; *weighty*, to that, which burdens the mind. It requires strength, to carry the one; parts, to support the other.

Weak men find that, *heavy*, which, the strong find, light. The administration of state affairs, is too *weighty* a concern, for one person to undertake.

51.

To *Conquer,*
Subdue,
Overcome.

Each of these words, implies, resistance; but, that of *conquer*, refers to victory over enemies; and is, generally, used in the literal sense: that of *subdue*, is more applicable to our passions; being, oftener, used in a figurative; and means, a bringing under subjection: that of *overcome*, supposes efforts, against any obstacle that opposes; meaning, rather, to surmount.

We have *conquered* our enemies, when we have beat them, in such a manner, as to put it out of
D their

their power, to do us any further hurt. We may be said, to have *subdued* our lusts, when we are able to withstand every temptation. We *overcome* our adversaries, when we obtain our end, in spite of every opposition.

It requires courage and valour, to *conquer*; endeavour and resolution, to *subdue*; patience and perseverance, to *overcome*.

Alexander gloried more in his *conquests*, than in any other thing upon earth. Of all passions, avarice is the most difficult to *subdue*; as neither age, or, weakness of constitution, is able to rebate its edge. We should strive to *overcome* evil, with good.

53.

*To no purpose,
Ineffectually,
In vain.*

We work, *to no purpose*, when we meet not with the reward, we expected to receive; *ineffectually*, when that, which we have done, answers not the end proposed; *In vain*, when our work, is of no kind of use whatever.

I shall have worked *to no purpose*, if these sheets meet not with the approbation of the public; *Ineffectually*, if, after all my trouble, I have not been able to shew the true difference between words, reputed synonymous; and, *in vain*, if the book is found to be, neither amusing or instructive.

54. *Wave,*

54.

*Wave,
Surge,
Billow.*

Waves, are the natural effect of the fluidity of a running water ; they are as applicable to rivers, as the sea ; and, leave the idea of a calm. *Surges*, are applied, properly, to the sea, only ; imply swol'n waves, and, mark a small degree of agitation. *Billows*, proceed from a more violent motion, consequently, denote a greater agitation ; they break into white foam, and, are attended with no little roar.

We cut through the *waves* ; are lifted, by the *surges* ; tossed and dashed, by the *billows*.

The life of some men, may, be, aptly, compared to the sharp-keeled vessel, cutting through the *waves*, leaving no noise or track behind it : while that of others, may be represented, as tossed up and down, on the wind-swoln *surges* of a boisterous fortune ; or, dashed in pieces, by the foaming *billows* of adversity.

55.

*Uproar,
Tumult,
Riot.*

Uproar, conveys an idea of some great noise ; *tumult*, and, *riot*, of some great disorder.

The difference between the words *tumult*, and, *riot*, is, that *tumult*, implies, the rising of many
D 2 people ;

people; *riot*, the disturbance of a few; whereas, an *uproar*, may be occasioned, by one single person.

Tumults, and, *riots* are, always, attended with such *uproars*, as give umbrage to a peaceable neighbourhood.

Houses of debauchery, are subject to *riots*: a *tumult* often happens, in ill-policed cities.

56.

Inclination,
Propension,
Bias.

These three words rise gradually; *inclination*, implying some thing less strong, than *propension*; *propension*, than *bias*: the first, leads us to an object; the second, draws us, the third, drags us.

Inclination, is, greatly, owing to education; *propension*, to custom; *bias*, to constitution.

Choice of company, is essential to the education of youth, because, at that age, they imbibe easily the *inclinations* of those, whose company they keep. It is a dangerous thing, to give a loose to any one vice, as frequent commission, is apt to create strong *propension*. Persons of warm constitutions, have a natural *bias* to venery.

Inclination, is, generally, applied to good objects; *propension*, to bad. Thus, we say, the charitable man is ever *inclined* to assist his neighbour. So depraved is human nature, that we have, always, a *propension* to vice.

Of two persons to be served, a foreigner, and, a countryman; we are, generally, *biased* in favour of the last.

57. *Should,*

57.

*Should,
Ought,
Is necessary.*

The first of these expressions, implies, more precisely, an obligation of complaisance, custom, or, personal interest : thus, we *should* not offend the company, we are in ; we *should* follow the fashion ; we *should* know a man, before we trust him. The second, denotes, more particularly, an obligation of reason and good sense ; thus, we *ought* in every thing, to give up to those, who know better than ourselves ; we *ought* to serve them, who have served us. The third, is more used to express an essential and indispensable obligation ; thus, it *is necessary*, to love God, in order to be saved : It *is necessary*, to be complaisant, to please.

58.

*Furthermore,
Moreover,
Besides.*

Furthermore, is, properly, used, when there is need only to add one more reason, to those, before-mentioned ; its intent, is to multiply, and, it has no relation, but to number. *Moreover*, is in its right place, when used, to add a reason of a different kind, to those, that went before ; its chief

chief office is, to add, with a particular respect, to diversity. *Besides*, is used with propriety, when we would strengthen by a new reason, the force of those, that were sufficient of themselves, its principal office is, to enhance by abundance.

For a state to support itself, those, who govern, should be moderate; those who ought to obey, governable; *furthermore*, the laws should be judicious. There will always be war among men, because, they are naturally ambitious, and are governed by interest; *moreover*, zeal for religion, makes them rigid. Holy Scripture teaches us the unity of the Godhead, and, reason points it out to us: *besides*, all nature makes us perceive it.

59.

To *Manifest*,
Publish,
Proclaim.

These three words, imply, open declaration; but that of *manifest*, seems to convey, a proof of what is made known; meaning, to shew incontestably: *Publish*, denotes, only, a simple declaration, but general: to *proclaim*, is, to make known by a formal and legal publication.

When once a man has lost his name, let him *manifest* his good character, as much as possible, he will find it difficult, to recover the good opinion of mankind; for prejudice is blind, even, to the most visible truths. He who *publishes* to the world, the failings of another, betrays in himself,

himself, a want of humanity, and, is sure to meet with the contempt of every thinking man. A famous Sultan of Egypt left to posterity, a most remarkable testimony of the vanity of earthly grandeur ; for, on his death-bed, he commanded, that his winding-sheet should be carried at the end of a lance, by a herald ; who was to *proclaim*, here is all, that this great prince will carry out of the world with him, of his wealth, dignity, and dominion, that he enjoyed upon earth.

Manifestos of a state, are, usually, *published*, by formal *proclamation*.

60.

To Tell,
Disclose,
Reveal,

To Divulge,
Discover.

To make known that which is unknown, is the common signification of those words : but, to *tell*, is to declare things purposely, with a design to inform those, we would not have remain ignorant. To *disclose*, is to shew, either by design or inadvertency, that which was before concealed. To *reveal*, is to lay open a secret : to *divulge*, is to do the same abroad. To *discover*, is the declaring a person to have done a thing, which he would not have been thought the author of.

So great an itch, have some persons for prattling, that they *tell* every individual thing they hear. Confidants too often *disclose* the intrigues, they are entrusted with. Confessors *reveal*, sometimes,

sometimes, by their imprudence, the confession of penitents. The *divulging* of a secret, has, often, done more harm, than any other one thing whatever; as it is impossible to smother, what once has been blazed abroad. If we would not be *discovered*, we should be careful to have no witness of our actions.

61.

Equivocation,
Ambiguity,
Double-entendre.

Equivocation, has two senses; the one, natural, in which, we would have what we say understood, and, in which, the hearer does, absolutely, understand us; the other, perverted, understood only, by the person speaking. *Ambiguity*, has one general sense, susceptible of different interpretations; it, always, creates a difficulty in getting at the true sense of the author, and, sometimes, an impossibility. The *double-entendre*, a French word lately naturalized, has two natural and apt significations, one of which presents itself to the common understanding of all the world; and, by the other is made, a fine allusion, understood, but by certain persons.

These three ways of speaking, are, upon occasion, ingenious methods of concealing one's true meaning: but we make use of an *equivocation*, to deceive; of an *ambiguity*, to keep in the dark, from all; and of a *double-entendre*, to conceal, from some.

It

It is beneath the character of an honest man, to make frequent use of *equivocations*; he that does, being sure to meet with the contempt of mankind. *Ambiguities*, are perhaps, oftener the effect of a confusion of ideas, than a studied design of keeping people in the dark: we ought never to use them, but when an elucidation would be dangerous. Malice and politeness have introduced the *double-entendre*, but it should never, be used, at the expence of our neighbours reputation.

62.

*Great,**Big,**Large.*

The word *great*, is a general term, signifying any thing considerable either in bulk, extent, quality, number, &c. thus we say, a *great* house; a *great* road; a *great* weight; a *great* many; a *great* famine; a *great* happiness. The words *big*, and, *large*, are more circumscribed; *big*, implies, greatness of bulk; *large*, greatness of extent. Thus, we say, a *big* man; a *big* stone; but, a *large* room; a *large* field.

A *large* man, is as great an impropriety, as a *big* field; and we need, only, mention a *big* or *large* pleasure, to shew the absurdity.

63.

*Grave,
Serious,
Staid.*

We are *staid*, through discretion and custom; *grave*, thro' humour and constitution; *serious*, thro' taste and affectation.

Levity is the reverse, of being *staid*; vivacity, of *gravity*; wantonness, of *seriousness*.

A constant round of business and continual transaction of affairs, make us *staid*; reflections on our latter end, give *gravity*; the desire of being thought *grave*, *seriousness*.

64.

*Genius,
Talent.*

These are both born with us, and are a happy disposition of nature, by which, we are qualified for some peculiar employment: but *genius*, seems to be more internal, and possessed of the powers of invention; *talent*, more external, and capable of execution.

Thus, we have a *genius*, for poetry and painting; but, a *talent*, for speaking and writing.

Such as have a *genius*, for mechanics, may have no *talent* for watch-making.

65. *People,*

65.

*People,
Persons.*

The word *people*, is so very general, that it cannot be connected with a determinate number; as, for instance, four, five, or, six *people*; but that of *persons*, may.

To be pleasant at table, none should be admitted but *people* of good humour; neither, should there be more, than seven or eight *persons*.

In order to describe a company, we should know the quality of the *people*, and the number of *persons*, present.

In all governments, we find ill-affected *people*: and there are, always, among a number, some discontented *persons*.

66.

*To Regard,
Concern,
Touch.*

We say, very indifferently, without much choice, that a thing *regards* us, *concerns* us, or, *touches* us, to mark the part we bear in it. There, nevertheless, appears to me, to be a delicate distinction between these three expressions, each rising, gradually, above the other, according to the rank, in which, I have placed them. Tho' we have the least part, imaginable, in a thing, it may be said, to *regard* us; to *concern* us, we must have

have a greater ; but, when we are sensibly affected by it, it may be said, to *touch* us. It seems also, that the word *regard*, is more applicable, when our interest is in question ; that of *concern*, when speaking of things, committed to our care and conduct ; that of *touch*, when it respects our honour or fortune.

The ill-behaviour of a servant, to a customer, *regards* the master ; as it affects his interest. The least disturbance in Europe, in some measure, *regards* every state ; it being difficult, for any of them, to keep a perfect neutrality, for any length of time, while the others are at war. All the operations of government, *concern* the first minister. It *concerns* a man, to be punctual, in the discharge of his duty ; The conduct of a wife, *touches* the husband, so close, that he ought to have an eye over all she does. The behaviour of an ambassador, *touches*, always, more or less, the honour of the prince he represents.

Many people make themselves uneasy at that, which does not, in the least, *regard* them ; meddle with what no ways *concerns* them ; and, at the same time, are indifferent to those things, which *touch* them nearly.

67.

*Tranquillity,**Peace,**Quiet,*

These words, let them be applied either, to the soul, to a republic, or any particular society, express, equally, a situation exempt from trouble
and

and molestation; but *tranquillity*, relates to that, within oneself, and in the time present, independent of any other relation: *peace*, to the situation, with regard to enemies, in whose power it is, to make an alteration: *quiet*, with respect to time past or future, as succeeding or preceding a situation troubled.

Uneasy people have no *tranquillity* in their families. Litigious persons are hardly ever at *peace* with their neighbours. After a troublesome time, we enjoy a *quiet* state, with greater satisfaction.

What a state of *tranquillity*, does the religious man enjoy; no outward things having the power to ruffle or discompose him! To preserve *peace*, we should keep ourselves, always, in a state of defence. It is *indulgence*, only, that will establish *quiet* in a mutinous people.

68.

Temple,
Church.

Both these words signify, an edifice, set apart for the public service of religion; but that of *temple*, is a more pompous expression, and less in use, than *church*: with respect to the Pagan religion, we, frequently use the word *temple*: as the *temple* of Apollo; the *temple* of Janus; but with relation to our own, seldom: St. Paul's *church*; St. Saviour's *church*.

Temple, seems to express something, more august, and signifies, properly, an edifice, dedicated to the deity. *Church* something, more common,

common, signifying, particularly, an edifice, erected for the congregation of the faithful.

The grandeur of Solomon's temple, was beyond description. Nothing profane ought to enter the temple of the Lord. The present thinness of our churches, is a manifest sign of a decrease in religion. Nothing ought to be permitted in church, that does not contribute to the edification of Christians.

69.

*Huge,
Vast,*

*Enormous,
Immense.*

The common idea of these words, is something, greatly, beyond the usual measure; but those, of *huge*, and, *vast*, relate, more, to such things, as are material; those, of *enormous*, and, *immense*, to such, as are ideal; with this difference, between them; that *huge*, implies, greatness in bulk; *vast*, greatness in extent; *enormous*, greatness in size, even to deformity and dreadfulnes; *immense*, unlimited extent, even beyond expression. Thus, we say, a *huge* giant; a *vast* tract of land; an *enormous* crime; the *immense* expanse.

There are some promontories, so *huge*, as to shock the eye that views them. The desarts of Arabia, are so *vast*, that unless travellers carried their lodging and provision with them, they would perish, before they reached their journey's end. The sins of the presumptuous wretch, are so *enormous*, that he can have little hopes of salvation, but, in the infinite mercies of an all-graci-

ous

ous God. So great is the *immensity* of the God-head, as to exceed the utmost stretch of human thought.

70.

Way,

Road.

Way, is much more extensive and general, than *road*; and implies the passage from place to place, whether through the high *road*, or not: *road*, is much more limited, and particular, and means the beaten way of travellers, from one town or city to another. Which, says the traveller, is our best *way* to Hampton; the Hounslow *road*, or Kingston? either *road*, says his guide, is good; but when we come to Twickenham, the shortest *way*, is across the fields; tho' the pleasantest *way*, would be, to go by water.

As the word, *way*, is, often, used to signify, means; which, when considered as the intermediate step to attainment, is not, widely, different from that, of *road*; when we would adopt the figure of travelling, not to confuse our ideas, we, generally, make use of the word *road*: thus, diligence with perseverance, is the high *road* to preferment; yet, notwithstanding, *way* is a much more elegant expression: a strict adherence to the principles of Christianity, is the direct *way* to heaven.

71. *Ways,*

71.

Ways,
Means.

We go, the *ways* ; we use, the *means*.

Ways, are the methods, we take ; *means*, what, we put in execution, to succeed. The first word, enfolds in its idea, honour and probity ; the last, pays little or no regard, but, to the end aimed at. Thus, good *ways*, are those, which are just ; good *means*, those, which are sure.

Simoniacal practices, are very bad *ways* ; but, very good *means*, of obtaining benefices.

I cannot avoid here, taking notice of the ungrammatical impropriety, of annexing the singular number, to the word *means* ; the fault, almost, of every speaker and writer ; liberality, say they, is, a sure *means*, of becoming popular : there is, no better *means*, of keeping in with the world, than that, of passing by affronts, with composure : — Glaring absurdity ! since, the word, *means*, is evidently, plural, and it would be, much more, elegant, was the false concord avoided.

72.

Often,
Frequently.

One, relates to the repetition of the same acts ; the other, to a plurality of objects. We,
often,

often, disguise our thoughts: by doing the same thing, *often*, it becomes habitual. We, *frequently*, meet with traitors; we, *frequently*, do those things, which we repent of, afterwards.

There are two other words, bearing an equal signification with *often*, viz. *oft*, and, *oftentimes*, but they being, no more, than the same word, abbreviated and lengthened; it is needless, to take any further notice of them.

73.

Cannot,
Impossible.

One of these words, more properly, relates to inability; the other, to impossibility.

We *cannot* serve two masters. It is *impossible*, to execute two opposite orders, at the same time.

We *cannot* love one, by whom we have been injured. It is *impossible*, to love one, to whom, we have a natural aversion.

74.

Glory,
Honour.

Glory, expresses something, more singular, than *honour*. The one, makes us undertake, voluntarily, the most difficult things; the other, leads us, willingly, to the execution of the most rigorous exactions.

Quest

Quest of *glory*, sometimes, stimulates the soldier's courage, even to rashness; and notions of *honour*, in spite of fear, keep him, often, to his duty.

An indifference to *glory*, may pass unnoticed; but not so, with respect to *honour*.

It is customary, in conversation, to place interest, in opposition to *glory*; and inclination, to *honour*: thus, we say, an author, who labours after *glory*, takes more pains in the completion of his piece; than he, who works, merely for interest: and, when an avaritious man lays out his money, it is more through *honour*, than inclination.

75.

World,

Universe.

World, conveys only an idea, of one single being, though general; that which exists: *Universe*, an idea, of many beings, or, rather that, of all parts of the world; all that exists: the first, of these words, is, sometimes, used in the literal sense, as when, we say, the old and new *world*; and sometimes in a figurative, as, when we say, in this *world*, and in the other; the wicked *world*; the polite *world*: the second, is, always, used according to the letter; and in a sense that excludes no one thing: it is, for this reason, when we would express the *universe*, by the term, *world*, that, we are obliged to put the word, *all*, before it, which, we have no occasion to do, by *universe*;

universe ; for example, we should say, the sun warms *all the world*, and, is the heat of the *universe*.

Q.

Answer,
Reply.

The *answer*, is made to a demand or a question, asked ; the *reply*, to an answer or a remonstrance.

Academics are taught first, to start difficulties, and then, to *answer* them. It is nobler, to hear a wise remonstrance, and, profit by it ; than make any *reply*.

The word, *answer*, is more extensive in its signification, than *reply* ; we *answer* the questions of those, who ask us ; the demands, of such, as expect our services ; the examination of counsel ; the arguments of disputants ; the letters we receive ; and, for all our conduct. The word, *reply*, is far more limited ; it supposes a dispute, commenced from difference of sentiment ; we *reply*, to the answer, of an author, whose works we have criticised ; to the reprimands of those, whose correction, we are unwilling to submit to ; to pleaders ; to an answer in chancery.

An *answer*, should be clear, true, and dictated by reason, and good sense ; a *reply*, strong and convincing, armed by truth, and strengthened by experience.

We should teach children, as much as possible, to give nice and judicious *answers* ; and convince them,

them, that there is more honour, in listning, than in making *replies* to those, who have the goodness to instruct them.

77

Danger,
Hazard,

|

Risk,
Venture,

All these words, imply, chance of harm; but that, of *danger*, relates to the evil, that may happen; those, of *hazard*, *risk*, and, *venture*, to the good, we may lose; with this difference, that, *hazard*, expresses something, near; *risk*, something, at a distance; *venture*, something, farther off, relating only to the possibility of events. Hence those expressions, in *danger*, of death; in *hazard*, of our life; by giving a loose to debauchery, we *risk* our health; nothing *venture*, nothing have.

Danger, creates fear; *hazard*, alarm; *risk*, caution; but we, often *venture*, with the greatest satisfaction.

The avaritious man, spurred on by interest, fears no *danger*; *hazards* his health and happiness; runs every *risk* that attends his profession; and, gladly, *ventures* his all, in search of that, which, if obtained, he would not have the spirit, to enjoy.

78. *Against,*

78.

Against,
In spite of.

Both these, denote opposition; but, the expression, *in spite of*, implies, more resolution and greater force, than the word, *against*; *against*, supposing little, or no resistance, in the object opposed; but, *in spite of*, a considerable struggle.

We act *against* the will, or, *against* rule, and, *in spite of* oppositions.

The good man, does nothing, *against* the dictates of his conscience. The wicked man, commits sin, *in spite of* the punishment, annexed to it.

Rashness, will attempt things, *against* all appearance of success; and resolution, will pursue the attempt, *in spite of* all the obstacles it meets with.

79.

Boldness,
Audaciousness,

Impudence,
Effrontery.

There is a commendable *boldness*, that proceeds from a self-consciousness of worth; but the *boldness*, which is here meant, springs from ignorance; is brazen and presuming. *Audaciousness*, is a greater degree of *boldness*; such, as is steeled against reproof; is rude and noisy. *Impudence* consists, in being an utter stranger, to all kind of modesty; is scurrilous and abusive. *Effrontery*, proceeds.

proceeds from pride, and self-sufficiency ; is overbearing and insolent.

The *bold*, are unawed by diffidence ; they speak, with great assurance ; neither the quality or rank of those, they address, being able to disconcert them. The more you reprove the *audacious* man, the more it hardens him ; he, wilfully, forgets the respect, due to his superiors, and, idly, imagines his boisterous behaviour, a distinguishing mark of manhood. The weapons of the *impudent*, are sauciness and abuse ; which, they take up at every turn ; and, with which, they lay about them, in a most unmerciful manner. As great a cause of *effrontery*, as any, is the want of education ; he, whom it possesses, is arrogant and insolent, a stranger to good-sense, and unacquainted with the rules of good-breeding.

80.

Profitable,
Advantageous,
Beneficial.

Profitable, is more applicable to gain ; *Advantageous*, to honour, or any kind of convenience ; *beneficial*, to health.

Some kinds of merchandise, are far more *profitable*, than others. A good name is very *advantageous*, as, it serves to push us forward in the world. Loss of blood, to a feverish person, is very *beneficial*.

Light

Light *profits*, make a heavy purse. A seasonable word, spoke in favour, is, frequently, of more *advantage*, than the greatest services. The greatest *benefit* to the soul, is, a sincere repentance.

81.

To See,
Look at,

To Behold,
View.

We *see*, whatever strikes the sight: we *look at* an object, when we designedly cast our eye upon it: we *behold* it, when we look with attention: we *view* it, when we survey it.

We *see*, all objects before our eyes: we *look at*, those, which excite our curiosity: we *behold*, such, as cause our admiration: we *view*, those, we are desirous to examine.

We *see*, distinctly or confusedly. We *look at*, near, or at a distance. We *behold*, with wonder and attention. We *view*, with care and exactness.

The eyes, open, to *see*; turn, to *look at*; fix themselves, to *behold*; and move all ways, to *view*.

The connoisseur, in painting, *looks at* the first picture, he *sees*; if it be the work of a celebrated artist, he *beholds* it, with pleasure, and *views* every part of it, with the greatest minuteness.

82.

To *Stare*,
Gaze.

Though the common meaning of these words is, to fix both the eyes upon an object, and look at it with wonder, intently and earnestly; yet, there is a great difference between them: *staring*, implies, looking, with wonder and impudence; *gazing*, with wonder and respect.

The impudence of some fellows, is so great, that, they will *stare*, a modest woman, out of countenance.

A man in love, will, sometimes, *gaze* upon the object of his affections, till he, almost, loses his sight.

When our Saviour first appeared to his disciples, after his resurrection; they *gazed* on him, with astonishment and rapture.

To *stare* another, in the face, has, always, been considered, as a breach of good manners.

83.

Useful,
Serviceable.

As nearly synonymous, as these words may appear to be, there is, yet, a manifest difference between them, but the distinction is so delicate, as to require some attention to discover it. *Useful*, in my opinion, is more applicable to things, in use; to those we have often recourse to; and
what,

what, cannot be well done without: *Serviceable*, to things, of service, such, as we, oftener, do without, than with: and such, as we little expect to have. Thus, furniture is *useful*; memorandum books, to persons engaged in a multiplicity of Business, are *useful*. Friends and good connections, are *serviceable*.

The plummet, is so *useful* to the carpenter; that, to fix a perpendicular, without it, would give him a great deal of trouble. Of all animals, a horse, is the most *serviceable*.

To those, who take snuff, a box, is extremely *useful*; but its contents, very far, from *serviceable*.

84.

Gulph,
Abyss.

What these words should express, is rather imaginary, than real: they are, generally, used therefore in a figurative sense: we are supposed to be swallowed up, by a *gulph*; and lost, in an *abyss*. The first, carries with it, an idea of insatiable voracity, which drags in and consumes all, that approaches; the second, of an unmeasurable depth, to whose bottom, we can never get; and in which, we lose, at the same time, the sight of the place, from whence, we came, and of that, where, we are going.

A *guiph*, is supposed to have, many turns and windings; of which, when we have once set a

E

step

step in, we cannot possibly get out, but are carried on, in spite of all our endeavours to the contrary. An *abyss*, is supposed to have, many uncertain and obscure roads, without end; in which, tho' we may, sometimes, stoop, in hopes of finding a way out; yet, being deceived, we become disheartened, bewildered with doubts, and overwhelmed with despair.

A loose woman, is a *gulph* of woe, all perishes there; virtue, riches, and health. Philosophy, teaches us, that man is, continually, wandering, in an *abyss* of darkness.

85.

*Determination,
Resolution.*

Determination, is an act of judgment, and supposes examination; *resolution*, an act of the will, and supposes deliberation: the first shuts out suspense; the last, wavering.

Our *determinations*, should be just, to avoid repentance; our *resolutions*, fixed, to exclude variation.

Nothing is more disagreeable, both to ourselves and others; than to be, always, *undetermined*, in our affairs, and *irresolute*, in our proceedings.

It is more difficult, to *determine* on points of precedence; than, on solid and real interests. There are, no weaker *resolutions* than those, made at confession, or, on a sick-bed; the first return of health, carrying us again, into the same course of life.

We

We may be *determined*, and yet not *resolved*; that is, we may come to some decision, and still, not be so far *resolved*, as to put that decision, into execution; fear, timidity, or, some other motive, may prevent us.

The *determinations* of women, are seldom better grounded, than on whimsey or caprice: Men, are, so often, led by taste and custom, that their *resolutions* are, generally, vain.

In science, we say, the *determination* of a point; the *resolution* of a difficulty.

The more, we *determine*, the less, we prove. Though, in the schools, we answer every difficulty, we *resolve* but few.

86.

Old,
Ancient,
Antique.

These words rise one upon the other; *antique*, upon *ancient*, and that, of *ancient*, upon *old*.

A fashion is *old*, when it ceases to be in use; *ancient*, when its use, has been, sometime, past; *antique*, when it has been, a long time, *ancient*.

That, which is recent, is not *old*; that, which is new, is not *ancient*; that, which is modern, is not *antique*.

Oldness agrees best with age; *ancientness*, with the origin of families; *antiquity*, with what existed in former times.

As we grow *old*, we decrease in strength; but gain more experience.

Ancientness, makes fashions disagreeable; but adds splendour to nobility.

Antiquity, destroys the proofs of history, and weakens credit; but renders monuments of greater value.

87.

General,
Universal.

General, implies, a great number of particulars; *universal*, every particular.

The government of princes, has no object in view, but, the *general* good. The providence of God, is *universal*.

An orator speaks, in *general*, when he makes no particular application. Knowledge is *universal*, when it knows every thing.

Christianity is, *generally*, known and believed; but, not *universally*.

88.

Word,
Term,
Expression.

Nothing is more common, than an indiscriminate use of these words; and yet none differ more among themselves. A *word*, is a single part of speech; is *general*, and determined by use: *Term*,
is

is a particular cast of language; owes it formation to the subject, and its excellence, to its suitability. *Expression*, is a certain mode of speech; rises from thought, and is, more or less, beautiful, according to its particular turn.

The purity of language, depends upon its *words*; the precision, upon its *terms*; and brilliancy, upon its *expressions*.

Elaborate discourses, require the *words*, to be, truly, English; the *terms*, proper; and the *expressions* noble

A *word*, which has escaped us, undesignedly, sometimes, has been attended with fatal consequences. *Terms* of art, are now, pretty generally, known; however, they appear with little grace, except, in the mouths of the professors of those arts. Starched or far-fetched *expressions*, carry with them, an air of pedantry.

89.

Pile,
Heap.

These words, equally, signify a quantity of things together, one upon another; with this difference, that *pile*, rather means, things put up, regularly; whereas, *heap*, implies no other order in the arrangement, than what rises from chance. As, a *pile* of wood; a *heap* of rubbish.

We say, a *pile* of bricks, when they are the materials prepared for building; and a *heap* of bricks, when they are the remains of a fallen edifice.

90. *Departure,*

90.

Departure,
Death,
Decease.

Departure, is a stile, more refined, and carries with it, an idea of the passage, from one life, to another; *death*, more common, and signifies, precisely, extinction of life; *decease*, more studied, is a term somewhat bordering upon the law, and implies, the refuge of mortality. The second of these words, is made use of, with respect to all sorts of animals; the other two, to man only.

A glorious *departure*, is preferable to a shameful life. *Death*, is the common lot of all things living. Succession, does not take place, 'till the moment of *decease*.

Departure presents nothing horrid to the imagination, it indicates something agreeable, in eternity; *decease*, conveys, only, an idea of trouble, in being separated from things, we are much attached to: but *death*, presents something dreadful and affrighting.

91.

Value,
Worth.

Value, rises from the intrinsic goodness of things; *worth* from the estimation, of them.

Of two things, the best, is the most *valuable*; and that *worth* most, that bears the greatest price.

92. *Valley,*

92.

Valley,
Bottom,

|

Vale,
Dale.

Of these four words, *valley*, implies, a narrow space, situated between two hills; *bottom*, a like space, but, quaggy and disagreeable. *Vale*, signifies, a space, more extended: whereas, *dale*, means, rather, low lands.

The words, *dale* and *vale*, are, oftener, found in poetry; *valley* and *bottom*, in prose.

Valleys are, for the most part, winding, and, as they receive water from the hills on each side, are, generally, converted into meads. He, whose house stands in a *bottom*, cannot live on a more unhealthy spot. A fine *vale*, with beautiful enclosures, bounded by rising woods, is a delightful prospect. *Dales*, are much easier to be ploughed, than hilly lands.

93.

Head,
Chief.

The word *head*, is reckoned synonymous only, to *chief*, when used in a figurative sense; but, even then, it requires a different application. *Head*, agrees best, with respect to arrangement: *chief*, with regard to subordination. Thus, we say, the *head* of a battalion, or, a ship; the *chief* of a party, or, an undertaking.

A commander in *chief*, is generally, at the *head* of his troops.

94. *Impediment,*

94.

Impediment,
Obstacle,
Obstruction.

There seems to be a gradation in these words. The *impediment*, stays; the *obstacle* resists; the *obstruction*, puts an entire stop to.

We say, remove the *impediment*; surmount the *obstacle*; take away or vanquish the *obstruction*.

Even small *impediments*, sometimes, prove such *obstacles*, as *obstruct* our best endeavours.

The word, *impediment*, seems to express something, rising from the nature and proper circumstances of what we are about; that, of *obstacle*, something, from a foreign cause; that of *obstruction*, something, proceeding from a superior force.

Every temptation, may be said, to *impede* our resolutions to virtue. The eloquence of Demosthenes, was the greatest *obstacle*, that Philip of Macedon found, in all his political undertakings, and which he could never surmount, but by force of arms. Nearness of kin, is an *obstruction* to marriage, which the laws have made, and which, those laws, only, can take away.

95. *Learning,*

95.

Learning,
Literature,
Erudition.

Of all order of words, there does not appear a more regular climax than in the above three; which seems to be compleated, by the word, KNOWLEDGE; but as that, has never been accounted synonymous with these, I shall take no notice of it, here.

Learning, implies, simply, that knowledge, which we acquire, by our common study at school. *Literature*, denotes, polite learning, or, an acquaintance with the BELLES LETTRES, and is rather, practical: but *erudition*, signifies, great depth of knowledge, with a particular relation to that, which is speculative.

Without some degree of *learning*, 'tis impossible to pass well through the world. There was a time, when the nobility piqued themselves, on being men of *literature*. A taste for *erudition*, will furnish infinite amusement, for a tranquil and retired life.

96.

To *Inquire,*
Interrogate,
Ask.

We *inquire*, we *interrogate*, we *ask*, in order to know; but the verb, *inquire*, implies, curiosity;

sity; that, of *interrogate*, authority; that of *ask*, something, more, civil and respectful.

The words *inquire*, and *interrogate*, make sense, by themselves; but, to use the word *ask*, with propriety, we must add the matter to it; that is, to make the sense perfect, we must mention the thing we *ask*.

'Tis the business of a spy, to make *enquiries*. Criminals are *interrogated* by the judge. The soldier *asks* orders from the commanding officer.

97.

To *Shun*,
Avoid,
Fly.

We *shun*, those persons, whom we would not see, or by whom, we would not be seen. We *avoid*, doing things, that are disagreeable to us. We *fly*, both persons and things, which we fear and dread.

In the words, *shun* and *avoid*, which seem to have the nearest affinity to each other; there is this standing difference, that, the word, *shun*, is generally, applied to persons; that, of *avoid*, to things.

In order to *fly*, we turn to the opposite side, and get quick away, to prevent being taken; in order to *shun*, we take another road, getting slyly away, to *avoid* being seen, or to escape a trap; in order to *avoid*, we use some extraordinary means.

We *shun* troublesome company. We *avoid* running into excess. We *fly* those, who pursue us.
 Knowledge

Knowledge of the world, makes us *shun*. Prudence makes us *avoid*. Fear, makes us *fly*.

The best remedy against the plague, is to *fly* far from the place where it is. The surest method of preserving our innocence, is to *shun* bad company. It is an act of the greatest weakness, not to *avoid* doing those things, which are detrimental to our interest.

98.

Severity,
Rigour.

Severity, shews itself, chiefly, in the manner of thinking and judging; it condemns readily and admits of no excuse. *Rigour*, is seen, particularly, in the manner of punishing; it pardons nothing, nor lightens the stroke.

False devotees are *severe*, only, to others, whom, they are ever eager to condemn; and are always applauding their own actions. *Rigour* can never be justifiable, but, at those times, when example is of the utmost consequence; yet, even then, some sort of allowance should be made for human frailty.

99.

To *Succour*,
 Help,

To *Assist*,
 Relieve.

We make use of the word, *succour*, in danger;
help, in labour; *assist*, in want; *relieve*, in distress.

trefs. The first, springs from a motive of generosity ; the second, from good nature ; the third, from humanity ; the fourth, from compassion.

We give *succour*, in battle ; we *help*, when we carry part of another's burden ; we *assist*, the poor ; and *relieve*, the afflicted.

The policy of states has found it necessary to *succour* each other, when the power of any one of them, is gaining too great a head. Very extraordinary things have been done, by the joint *help* of numbers. Many a parent, has beggar'd himself, in advancing the fortune of his child, 'tis therefore, the indispensable duty of that child, to *assist* his father, to the utmost of his power. The truly compassionate man, receives, as much inward satisfaction in *relieving* the distressed, as he communicates.

100.

Always,
Continually,
Perpetually.

That which we do, *always*, we do, at all times, and on all occasions ; that, which is done, *continually*, is done, without interruption, or intermission, but, for a time limited ; whereas, what is done, *perpetually*, is done, also, without intermission, and, without any regard to time.

We should, *always*, prefer our duty to our pleasure. It is impossible to be, *continually*, at work. The heavenly bodies are, *perpetually*, in motion.

To

To please in company, we should, *always*, talk well, but not, *continually*. The longitude may be discovered by *perpetual* motion.

101.

*Diversity,
Variety.*

Diversity, supposes a change, which taste is always in search of; in order to discover some novelty that may enliven and delight it: *variety*, supposes a plurality of things, differing from each other in likeness, which cheers the imagination, apt to be cloyed with too great a uniformity.

Without some *diversity*, life would be, altogether, insipid. Nature has thrown infinite *variety* among the smallest objects; which, if we cannot perceive, is owing to a defect of light.

An agreeable *diversity* of colours, will give as much pleasure to the eye, as harmonious sounds to the ear. *Variety* of amusements, insensibly, lead us into a dissipation.

102. *Difference,*

102.

*Difference,
Dispute,
Quarrel.*

Opposition of interests, causes, *differences*. Contrariety of opinions, produces *disputes*. Harshness of dispositions, is the source of *quarrels*.

We make up, the *difference*. We end, the *dispute*. We appease, the *quarrel*.

Envy and covetousness, make, sometimes, great *differences* for trifles. Prejudice and want of attention to what is said, commonly, prolong *disputes*. *Quarrels*, for the most part, proceed more from disposition, than animosity.

103.

*Ill,
Sick.*

These two words, are considered, only, as synonymous, when they imply, afflicted with disease; but, as indiscriminately, as they may be used, even in that sense, still, they convey different ideas, marking different degrees of illness. The word *ill*, in my opinion, is used, with most propriety, when health is the least impaired; that of *sick*, when the body is greatly diseased. Thus we say, when we find a heaviness upon the spirits, or, a want of appetite: that we are *ill*; but when the whole frame of any one is disordered, we, naturally, say, he is *sick*.

When

When we apply either of these words to ourselves, they carry very different meanings; thus, I am *ill*, is general, and implies, disordered, in any part of the body; whereas, I am *sick*, is particular, and means, disordered, in the stomach.

There is, yet, a further distinction between them; *Ill*, is most applicable, when in pain only; *sick*, when diseased; thus, we say, he is *ill* of the gout; but, *sick*, of a fever.

104.

Disease,
Distemper,
Sickness.

Disease and *distemper*, imply, particular disorders, with this difference, that, *disease* is more applicable to man; *distemper*, to brutes; whereas, *sickness*, is more general, and may be applied to either.

Diseases, such as the plague, fevers, &c. are, sometimes, so epidemical, as to lay waste more, than the sword. *Distempers*, among cattle, are, generally, infectious. Divine displeasure hath, often, shewn itself, by a general *sickness*, among men and beasts.

Both *diseases* and *distempers*, when, become universal, are *sicknesses*, so severe, as draw the joint prayers of a people, in hopes to avert them.

105. *Weary,*

105.

Weary,
Tired,
Fatigued.

It is the continuation of the same thing, that either, *wearies*, or *tires*, with this difference, that, *weary*, implies, a less degree; *tired*, a greater; but it is labour that *fatigues*. We grow *weary*, or *tired* with standing. We are *fatigued* with work.

When we are *weary* of a thing, to complete it, we lack spirits; when, *tired*, we are, totally, unable; when *fatigued*, we want strength to go through it, as we would.

Weariness, proceeds, sometimes, from an unwillingness, in what we undertake; we are, frequently, *tired*, through disposition of body, and slow circulation of blood; but, *fatigue*, is, always, the consequence of much action; it supposes excess of work, with respect, either to difficulty or length of time.

In a figurative sense, a petitioner grows *weary*, through his impatience; *tired*, thro' his perseverance; and *fatigued*, through his importunities.

We are *weary*, with waiting; *tired*, with ill-success; and *fatigued* with pursuing.

Thus, may we be *weary*, and not *tired*; *tired*, yet, not *fatigued*.

106. *Light,*

106.

Light,
Brightness,
Splendor.

Light, is, the origin or commencement of *brightness*; *splendor*, is, *brightness* in perfection.

The intention of *light*, is, only, to make objects visible, that, of *brightness*, to make them, clearly, distinguishable and known: *splendor*, shews them, to the greatest degree of perfection.

It is *light* at day-break; *bright*, in the morning; *splendid*, at noon.

We attribute *light*, to the stars; *brightness*, to the moon; and *splendor*, to the sun.

107.

Lustre,
Brilliancy,
Radiancy.

These three words, as the last, rise, gradually, one upon another, and mark the different degrees of the effect of light.

Lustre, seems to be possessed of polish, only; *brilliancy*, of light; but, *radiancy*, of fire.

Lustre, shines, only; *brilliancy*, dazzles; but, *radiancy*, glares.

We, seldom, make use of the word *lustre*, but, in the literal sense; whereas, we, frequently, use that, of *radiancy*, and, much more often,
that,

that, of *brilliancy*, in the figurative. Considered then, in this sense, it appears to me, that, it is the force of truth, the energy of language, and the newness of the thoughts, that gives *radiancy*, to a discourse; whereas, *brilliancy*, rises from the beautiful turns and lively touches of expression: and that, it is the choice of words, the agreement of terms, and the arrangement of phrases, that gives a *lustre*, to what is said.

108.

Wisdom,
Prudence.

Wisdom, makes us act and speak, properly; *prudence*, prevents our speaking, or acting, improperly. The first, in order to attain its ends, searches out the best paths to follow: the second, that it may not miss its aim, tries, to discover the bad ways, in order to avoid them.

Wisdom, is more knowing; *prudence*, more wary.

The *wise* man, makes use of those means, that are most proper for his purpose; he conducts himself, by the light of reason. The *prudent* man takes those ways, he thinks most sure; he does not venture, into places unknown.

An ancient writer, has said, that, it is a mark of *wisdom*, not to talk on any subject, but what, we are thorough masters of, especially, if we would be esteemed: we, may add to this maxim, that, it is a piece of *prudence*, not to bring a disagreeable subject on the tapis, particularly, if we are desirous of being beloved.

109.

To *Find*,
Meet with.

We *find*, things, unknown, or, which we sought after. We *meet with*, things, that are in our way, or, which present themselves to us, unfought for.

The unfortunate, *find*, always, some resource, in their misfortunes. People, who readily unite themselves with all the world, are liable to *meet with* bad company.

110.

Union,
Joining.

Union, relates, particularly, to two different things, which agree together. *Joining*, respects properly two distant things, which draw near together, one after the other.

The word, *union*, carries with it an idea of agreement, and fitness: that, of *joining*, seems to suppose, some kind of motion.

We say, the *union*, of colours; and the *joining*, of armies: the *union*, of two neighbours; and the *joining*, of two rivers.

That, which is not *united*, is divided: that which is not *joined*, is separated.

We *unite*, in order to form a society. We *join*, for the sake of company.

Union

Union is, often, used, in a figurative sense; but *joining*, only, in the literal.

Union, is the support of families, and the power of states. The *joining* of many streams, forms great rivers.

III.

Situation,
Condition,
State.

The words, *situation* and *condition*, imply, something accidental, and transitory; with this difference, that *situation*, respects outward circumstances; *condition*, those, within the matter referred to; whereas, that of *state*, implies, something, more habitual, and lasting.

We, generally, use the word, *situation*, as relative, to affairs, rank or fortune; *condition*, with respect, to the nature, quality or property of a thing; and that, of *state*, applying it to health, or, our well or ill-being.

We say, our *situation* is bad; when we are surrounded with difficulties: that a building is in bad *condition*, when out of repair; and, that some persons enjoy but an indifferent *state* of health.

An ill-*state* of health, added to a bad *situation* of affairs, is a *condition*, into which, every man must, naturally, dread the falling.

Such is the *condition*, and vicissitude of human life, that, the most prudent men, have, often, found themselves in perplexing *situations*; and from a *state* of happiness, have, as it were, through the

the perverseness of fortune, fallen into one most wretched and deplorable.

112.

*Of Fashion,
Of Quality.*

As synonymous, as these expressions may be, in the mouths of those, who use them; they, still, imply particular characters, in their right signification, when we are obliged, on certain occasions, to express ourselves properly. The last of these expressions, rises upon the first, and signifies the nobility; whereas, by the other, is, only, understood the gentry.

The pride and folly of the world is grown to so great a pitch, that persons in trade, are, continually, apeing people *of-fashion*; and those, *of-fashion*, people *of-quality*.

113.

*Notes,
Remarks,
Observations.*

Notes, imply, a shortness and precision: *remarks*, a choice and distinction: *observations*, something critical and far-fetched.

Notes, are, often, necessary: *remarks*, are, sometimes, *observations*, should be, always, learned.

Change

Change of manners and customs, for the most part, renders authors in want of *notes*. There are as good *remarks*, perhaps, to be made upon the moderns, as upon the ancients. *Historical observations*, make antiquity more known.

114.

To *Take*,
Receive,
Accept.

We *take*, what, is given us. We *receive*, what, is sent us. We *accept*, what, is offered us.

We *take*, money; we *receive*, favours; we *accept*, services.

To *accept*, implies, always, consent and approbation; to *receive*, does not; to *take*, excludes, only, refusal.

No man should ever *take* more, than his due. We should, always, acknowledge those civilities we have *received*. What, we have once *accepted*, should, never afterwards be rejected.

115.

Sentiment,
Opinion,
Thought.

These words are all in use, when the bare expression, only, of idea, is in question. In this sense, *sentiment*, is more certain; it is a belief, raised

raised by solid or apparent reasons; *opinion*, is more doubtful; it is a judgement, built on some foundation: *Thought*, is still less certain; springing, only, from conjecture.

The word *sentiment*, is used, with more propriety, when the subject, is on taste. That, Homer, is an excellent poet, is the *sentiment*, of every man of learning. The word *opinion*, agrees best, when talking of science. It is the general *opinion*, that the sun, is the centre of the world. The word *thought*, is, more particularly, in use, when we are judging of the event of things, or, the actions of men. Politicians have long *thought*, that, the Moscovians would find a greater advantage from Asia, than from Europe.

Sentiments, are, in some measure, guided, by the influence of the heart; we, often, find them in favour of those persons we love. *Opinions*, are frequently, owing to prejudice; it is common for scholars, to have good ones of their masters. *Thoughts*, rise, greatly, from imagination; they are, often, chimerical.

116.

Resolution,
Courage,
Valour,

Bravery,
Intrepidity.

Resolution, either banishes fear or surmounts it; it will not admit a falling back, but is staunch on all occasions. *Courage*, is impatient to attack; it undertakes boldly, and is not lessened by difficulty. *Valour*, acts with vigour; it gives no way to resistance, but, pursues its enterprize, in spite of opposition. *Bravery*, knows no fear; it

it runs nobly into danger, and prefers honour to life itself. *Intrepidity*, encounters the greatest perils with the utmost coolness; and dares, even present, death.

The three first of these words, seem more relative to action, than the two last; and the two last, seem to imply, a greater fearfulness of danger, than the three first.

Resolution, supports us in action. *Courage*, make us advance. *Valour*, makes us execute. Through *bravery*, we expose ourselves to danger. We would sacrifice ourselves through *intrepidity*.

Resolution, should never desert us: *courage*, should, always, determine us to do right: *valour*, would never make us despise the enemy: *bravery*, should not pride itself in opposition: nor, should *intrepidity*, shew itself, but, in cases of duty or necessity.

117.

Angry,
In a Passion,
Passionate.

An impatient agitation, or, arising of the blood, against any one, who has offended us, is the common-import of the two first, of these terms: The word, *angry*, implies, a passion more internal and lasting; whereas the expression, *in a passion*, carries in its idea, a sudden, external gust of anger; short, but violent.

Anger, shall, sometimes, brood in the breast, for years; till at last it becomes, as it were, fixed and settled; sometimes, it will dissemble, for a long

long while together ; but, often, finds it extremely difficult to pardon : On the contrary, it is the general characteristic of those, who are *in a passion*, to forgive, as soon as it subsides ; which may, perhaps, be the next quarter of an hour ; besides, the man, *in a passion*, cannot dissemble ; his violence of *anger*, must have vent ; when that's obtained, he is as cool as before : indeed, his *passion*, will now and then, settle into confirmed *anger*, but when that is the case, it is, generally, owing to repeated offences.

With respect to the word, *passionate*, there is a wide difference, between the man *in a passion*, and the *passionate* man ; the one, being extraordinary, the other, ordinary.

Few men, for example, can avoid being *in a passion*, when, they are, greatly, offended ; but *passionate* people, are heated, on the most trifling occasions.

118.

Hasty,
Passionate.

According to my conception, it appears, that *hasty*, relates, more, to action or blows ; and that, *passionate*, goes seldom farther, than words.

A *hasty* man, is apt to lift his hand ; it is, generally, with him, a word and a blow. A *passionate* man, will vent his anger in words, only.

We should be upon our guard, when, with *hasty* people ; and have patience, with the *passionate*.

F

119. *Strong,*

119.

Strong,
Robust,

Stout,
Sturdy.

Strength, is, chiefly, owing to the construction of the muscles. A little man is, often, *stronger*, than a greater. *Robustness*, carries with it, an idea of lustiness, is less subject to infirmities, and, much owing to constitution. A short man, may be *robust*. By *stout*, we understand tall and strong-made. A little man, tho' never so *strong*, cannot be called, *stout*. By *sturdy*, we mean *stout*, with a degree of hardiness.

Strength, gives a man an advantage over his enemies; *robustness*, lends him, an air of dignity and authority; *stoutness*, makes him, admired; *sturdiness*, is accompanied, with an air of meanness.

120.

Complaisant,
Polite,
Well-bred.

Complaisance, rises from the respect we shew those, whom we meet; is, sometimes, sincere, sometimes, not; *politeness*, from the flattering methods, we make use of in our behaviour and conversation; and is, generally, insincere; but, to be *well-bred*, is to shew the same honours, always, with sincerity.

Complaisance,

Complaisance, is the characteristic of the lover ; *politeness*, of the courtier ; but, to be *well-bred*, denotes, the gentleman.

We should be *complaisant*, without importunity ; and *polite*, without insipidity. The distinguishing mark of a *well-bred* man, is, the constant care he takes, never to disgust or offend.

121.

Hump-backed,
Crooked,
Deformed.

The true meaning of the word, *hump-backed*, is, having a rising, upon the back, owing either to *crookedness*, or some other cause, and may be either natural or accidental: tho' the words, *crooked* and *deformed*, convey other ideas, still nothing is more common, than to find them, frequently, in use to express the same as *hump-backed*. By *crookedness*, is understood, any deviation from natural straightness. *Deformity*, implies, any part of the body being imperfect or unnatural. Thus, a man is *crooked*, if any ways, twisted or bent from the natural shape ; and *deformed*, if he has an eye, a finger, or, a toe, too little, or, too much. We may be *hump-backed*, or, *crooked*, by a fall, or, some other accident ; but *deformed*, we cannot be, otherwise, than by a defect or exuberance in nature.

A man may be *deformed*, and not *crooked* ; *crooked*, yet not *hump-backed*.

122.

*Perfect,
Finished,
Complete.*

Perfection, regards, properly, the beauty, which rises from the design and construction of the work; *finishing*, that which rises from the workmanship and hand, of the workman. *Completion*, depends upon the want of nothing; but, on the work's having every thing, it should have. The first, excludes all sorts of defect. The second, shews a particular care and attention, to the minutest article. The third, respects more, the totality of parts.

We may, easily, make a thing *complete*; and with much pains, *finish* it; but, after all, it may not be *perfect*.

123.

*Misfortune,
Disaster,
Calamity.*

Each, of these words, denotes, a sad event; but, that, of *misfortune*, is applied to casualties, and, outward circumstances, things detached from us. *Disaster*, respects, properly, personal accidents. *Calamity*, implies, something, more general.

It

It is a *misfortune*, to lose our money or our friend. It is a *disaster*, to fall or be wounded. It is a *calamity*, to find ourselves, suddenly, disgraced and ruined in the world.

We say, a great *misfortune*; a shocking *disaster*; and a dreadful *calamity*.

Misfortunes, will happen to the best of men. We bring *disasters*, frequently, upon ourselves, thro' want of proper care. *Calamities*, are, often, sent by heaven, upon the wicked, to rouse them, from their sinful lethargy.

124.

To *Consent*,
Acquiesce,
Agree.

We *consent*, to the will of others, by permitting. We *acquiesce*, in what is proposed, by conforming. We *agree*, to what is said, by approving.

We, naturally, oppose, what, we do not *consent* to; discourage, what, we will not *acquiesce* in; and, dispute, what, we cannot *agree* to.

It appears to me, that, the word, *consent*, supposes some authority, in the person *consenting*; that, of *acquiesce*, some submission, in the person *acquiescing*; and that, the word *agree*, denotes, some aversion to dispute.

Parents, *consent*, to the marriage of their children. Parties, *acquiesce*, in the decree of a judge. Well-bred persons, *agree*, almost, to every thing.

125.

*Management,
Direction,
Administration,*

*Conduct,
Government.*

Management, respects, only, private things, trusted to the care of some one, to employ for the profit of another, and, to whom, he is to render an account; as that of a clerk, to his master. *Direction*, relates to certain affairs, where, there is a distribution, either of money, office or whatever else, is committed to the care of another, to preserve necessary order. *Administration*, refers to objects of greater consequence, such, as those of justice, or, the finances of a state; it supposes a pre-eminence of employ, which gives power, credit, and, a kind of liberty, in the department, the person is engaged in. *Conduct*, points out some knowledge and ability, with respect to things; and, a subordination, with regard to persons. *Government*, results from authority and dependance; it indicates a superiority of office, with a particular relation, to policy.

Whosoever has the *management* of any one's concerns in trust; should be as attentive and as careful, as if they were his own. He, who undertakes the *direction* of public charities; should divest himself of all prejudice and partiality. A judge ought to be wisely circumspect in the *administration* of justice; and, a prime minister intently wary, in the *administration* of public affairs. No one thing should be committed to
the

the *conduct* of another, unless, we are well persuaded, he has abilities, adequate to the task; and will act in conformity, to the intentions of him, whose business he undertakes. The man, who, thro' favour of his prince, is offered the helm of *government*; should, seriously, reflect on the arduous office; and not suffer his ambition, to get the better of his discretion.

126.

Affront,
Insult,
Abuse.

Affront, is an arrow of reproach and contempt, shot in public; it piques and mortifies those, who have any sense of honour. *Insult*, is an attack, made with insolence; it is, usually, repelled with spirit. Both *affronts* and *insults*, may be given, without words; but, *abuse* results, chiefly, from scurrilous language.

Affronts, are, often, given through the childish itch of revenge. *Insults*, are, too frequently the offspring of pride. We seldom, if ever, hear *abuse*, in the mouth of a well-bred man.

Happy is that person, that can put up *affronts*, with composure; bear *insults*, with calmness; and, turn a deaf ear, to *abuse*.

127. To,

127.

To,
In order, to.

These terms are synonymous in that sense, where, they signify, doing one thing, in view of another; but the word, *to*, denotes, a nearer view; the expression, *In order, to*, one, farther off.

We get introduced to a prince, *to* make our court: we make our court to him, *in order, to* obtain his favours.

The word, *to*, seems to agree best, when what we do, in view of some other thing, is, almost, certain to take effect. The expression, *in order, to*, appears to be used, with most propriety, when the thing we have in view, may not be the immediate consequence.

We fire cannon, against a besieged place, *to* make a breach, and *in order, to* take it, by assault, or, oblige the enemy to surrender.

To, respects, more particularly, an effect, which ought to be produced. *In order, to*, regards, properly, an aim, which we would obtain.

Young women, at a certain age, do all they can *to* please, *in order, to* procure themselves husbands.

128. *Outside,*

128.

*Out-side,
Appearance.*

In the literal sense; it is, the walls, the ditches, the courts, the gardens, the avenues that forms the *out-side* of a castle; but it is, the figures, the grandeur, the situation, and, the architecture, that determines the *appearance*: the *outside*, being the external part of a thing; the *appearance*, the effect, which a view of that thing produces, or the idea, we form of it, by that view.

In the figurative sense; *outside*, is, oftner, applied to our manners, and, our way of living: *appearance*, seems to be more in use, with respect to our actions and our conduct.

A brilliant *outside*, is no certain proof of a good fortune. Going, frequently, to church, is an *appearance*, that can determine little, with regard to virtue.

129.

*Vision,
Apparition.*

A *vision*, passes, inwardly, in the mind; and, is supposed to be, only, an action of the imagination. An *apparition*, strikes the senses, outwardly, and, is supposed to be, an object from without,

Joseph was warned by a *vision*, to fly into Egypt, with his family. Mary Magdalen was informed of the resurrection of our Saviour, by an *apparition*.

Feverish persons, often, think they see *visions*. Timid and credulous people, sometimes, take trees or posts, for *apparitions*; and, frequently, objects of their own imagination.

130.

To See,
Perceive.

Objects, that have some duration, or, that shew themselves, are *seen*; those, that pass by quickly, or, are hid, in some measure, from the eye, are, only, *perceived*.

We *see* the face, and, by that, *perceive* the disposition of the heart.

In a crowded court, those, who stand forward, are *seen*, by the prince; while others, behind, are scarcely *perceived*.

131.

To Fear,
be *Apprehensive*,

To Dread,
be *Afraid*.

We *fear*, an ill; through a natural aversion to it, and, from a sense, that it may happen to us: we are *apprehensive*, of losing a benefit; through an eager desire to obtain it, and, from a conviction that we never may: we *dread*, our adversary;

versary; through sentiments of esteem, when we know him our superiour: we are *afraid* of danger; through a timid disposition.

Want of courage, makes us *fear*. Doubt of success, makes us *apprehensive*. Distrust of strength, makes us *dread*. Imagination itself, will, often, make us *afraid*.

Common people *fear* death, more than any thing: the Epicureans were, much more, in *fear* of pain; but gentlemen, are of opinion, they ought to fear nothing, so much as infamy. The more, ardently, we wish for a thing, the more we *apprehend* the losing of it. Whatever merit, an author may flatter himself that he has, he should always *dread* the judgment of the public. Women, who are *afraid* of nothing, but losing their reputation; do honour to their sex.

132.

To Teach,
Learn,
Instruct.

To *teach*, is, only, to give lessons: to *learn*, is, to give lessons, with success: both which words, relate more to those things, that are proper to cultivate the mind, and, form a good education; for, which reason, we use them with propriety, when the arts and sciences are in question. To *instruct*, has a greater relation, to that, which is useful, in the conduct of life and success of affairs; it is, therefore, in its proper place, when speaking of any thing, that concerns either our duty, or, our interest.

Professors

Professors *teach*, in public schools, those, who come to hear them. The historian *learns*, posterity, the events of his times. A father *instructs*, his children, how they ought to live in the world.

It requires great knowledge, to *teach*, method and plainness, to *learn* others; experience and abilities, to *instruct*.

Many persons attempt to *teach*, what, they have occasion to study themselves. Some will undertake to *learn* others, what they, themselves, are, almost ignorant of. Very few, are capable of *instructing*.

133.

Gentle,
Tame.

Gentle animals, are, naturally so; *tame* ones, are so, partly by the art and industry of man.

The dog, the ox, and, the horse, are *gentle* animals; the bear, and, the lion, are sometimes, *tame*.

134.

To Bind,
Tie.

We *bind*, to prevent the limbs moving, or, the parts of a thing separating; we *tie*, to stop a thing, or, prevent its going any farther.

We *bind* the feet and hands of a criminal; and, we *tie* him to a stake.

In

In the figurative sense, a man is *bound*, when he is not at liberty to act; and, he is *tied*, when he cannot change his party, or, quit it.

Authority and power *bind*: interest and love *tie*.

We do not think ourselves *bound*, when we see not our bonds; and, we do not imagine ourselves *tied*, when we have no occasion to use our liberty.

135.

To *Hope*,
Expect.

The first of these words has, for its object, success in itself, and denotes, a trust, born up by some encouragement. The second, regards, particularly, the happy moment of event, and intimates, a certainty of its arriving; we *hope*, to obtain things: we *expect*, their coming.

We should always *hope*, for the indulgence of heaven; and, *expect*, without murmuring, the hour of Providence.

What we *hope* for, seems to be more a favour or a kindness; what we *expect*, more a duty or obligation. Thus, we *hope*, for favourable answers to our demands; and, we *expect*, such as are agreeable to our propositions.

I *hope*, my work will meet with the taste of the public; and, I *expect*, an equitable sentence.

136.

Weight,
Influence,
Sway.

Taking these words in the sense, of having power over the minds of others; *weight*, implies, prevalence, tho' small; *influence*, seems to have more force; *sway*, is more absolute.

Superiority of rank and reason, gives *weight*; it is commonly by persuasion, that it acts. Attachment to persons contributes much to the *influence*, they have over us; it is by solicitation, it prevails. The art of finding out and taking advantage of the weakness of men, forms the *sway*, we bear over them; 'tis by watching their motion, that we succeed.

The *weight* we have with others, proceeds, always, from some worth, in ourselves, either of mind, birth or fortune. *Influence* is owing to some tie, either of heart or interest. *Sway*, rises from an ascendancy, arrogated by art, or, ceded to us, thro' weakness.

A person of *weight*, has succeeded, sometimes, when arguments would have no force. *Influence*, on some occasions, hath wrought, almost, miracles, effecting that, which money could not bring to bear. *Sway*, is a wonderful operator on weak minds: procuring that, through art, which no other thing can, possibly, obtain.

What perverseness then, can possibly withstand a man of some *weight* in himself; whose *influence* is great, and, who knows how to bear a proper *sway*.

137. *Authority,*

137.

*Authority,
Power,
Dominion.*

We find in the word, *authority*, sufficient energy to make us perceive a right, either of civil or politic administration. There is in the word, *power*, a particular relation to the subordinate execution of superior orders. The word, *dominion*, carries with it, an idea of empire.

It is the law, which gives *authority*; it deriving all its might, from thence. *Power*, is invested in delegates, those, to whom the execution of the laws is entrusted, and is, consequently, in subordination to *authority*. *Dominion*, springs from the joint consent of the people, or, from the force of arms, and, is either lawful or tyrannical.

We are happy, in living under the *authority* of a Prince, who prides himself in justice; whose ministers assume no *power*, beyond what is legal; and, who makes the welfare of his subjects, the basis of his *dominion*.

Authority, if weak, is exposed to contempt; it is, equally, as dangerous, not to make use of it on proper occasions, as, even, to abuse it. A blind *power*, which acts in opposition to justice, becomes odious, and paves the way to its own ruin. A jealous *dominion*, that admits of no sharer, makes itself formidable; awakens, on that account, the ardor of its enemies, and, thus, ushers in its own fall.

There

There appears to me, particularly, in the idea of *authority*, something just and respectable; in the idea of *power*, something strong and active; and, in the idea of *dominion*, something great and elevated.

As there is none but God, that has an unlimited *authority*; so, there is none else, who has infinite *power*; neither is there any absolute, sovereign, and independent *dominion*, than his.

Nature has established no *authority* among men, but that of fathers, over their children; all other, proceeds from positive right. The *power* of the passions, is the true spring of action, and, determines us, with respect, either to good or evil. It is not only by the disposition of human laws, that marriage places the woman under the *dominion* of the man; but, it is, also, so settled by the divine.

138.

Volume,
Book.

A *volume*, may contain many *books*: A *book*, may make many *volumes*. The binding, properly, distinguishes the *volumes*; and, the division of the work, the *books*.

We must not, always, judge of the knowledge of an author, by the largeness of the *volume*. Works are, sometimes, spread out into many *books*, which would be more valuable, were they reduced to one.

139. To

139.

To *have a Mind, for,*
Long for,
Wish for,

To *Hanker after,*
Lust after.

The last, of these expressions, is more used in theology, and supposes, always, an illicit object, forbid by the laws of God; thus, we *lust after* a woman; or, the goods of another. The others, are all, in common use, and, express our inclination to a thing, be it what it will; with the following difference between them. We, *have a mind, for*, or, *long for*, a present object; but, *have a mind*, seems attended with more knowledge and reflection; *long for*, more opinion and more taste: we *wish for*, things, farther distant; we *hanker after* things, that more affect us.

Princes, sometimes, *have a mind*, to gratify their ambition, at the expence of their future welfare. Women with child, frequently, *long for* most things they see: Lazy people, often, sit down and content themselves, with *wishing for* those things, they would, presently, obtain, if diligent and assiduous. Some children will *hanker*, a long time, *after* their nurses, and, it is with the greatest difficulty, they can be brought to forget them.

140.

Gain,
Profit,

|

Lucre,
Emolument.

Gain, seems to arise from something very casual; and implies, risk and hazard; it is for this reason, the word, is in great use among gamesters and tradesmen. *Profit*, appears to be more sure; proceeding either from lands or industry. Thus, we say, the *profits* of the earth; or, the *profits* of our labour. The characteristic of *lucre*, consists in a simple relation, to the passion of interest; 'tis on this account, we say, with the greatest propriety, that man is fond of *lucre*. *Emolument* relates to commissions and employments; intimating, not only the salaries, but, all other perquisites.

Some persons are so particularly rigid, as to condemn all *gain*, arising from play. Many will, idly, call that *profit*, which has accrued by illicit means. It is low and sordid, to be ever led by *lucre*. We do not, always, find the greatest honour, in offices, where there is the greatest *emolument*.

141.

Very,
Extremely.

We are apt to use these words indifferently, one as well as the other, to express a great degree of any thing. Thus, for example, we say,
in

in the same sense, *very* wise; *extremely* wise; notwithstanding this, there appears to me some difference between them: The word, *very*, marks an extraordinary degree; but *extremely*, a degree to admiration. Thus, we say, men are, *very*, wicked: Providence is, *extremely*, kind.

Besides this distinction, there is one more delicate, which is, that *very*, does not suit well, but in the literal and natural sense; for when we say, a man is *very* wise; we would be understood, as saying, truly wise; whereas *extremely*, may be used with elegance, in an ironical sense. We say, then, in raillery, he is, *extremely*, wise, in ceasing to pursue that, he knows not how to get at; and, *extremely*, patient, in taking a blow calmly, he has not the spirit to return.

142.

Fantastical,
Whimsical,

|

Maggotty,
Fanciful.

Of these words, that of *fantastical*, implies, a rambling from true taste, thro' excess of delicacy, or, an unseasonable search after something better. That of *whimsical*, means, an affectation of singularity. By *maggotty*, is understood, a great inconstancy, or, sudden change of taste. *Fanciful*, implies, a certain revolution of humour, or, a particular way of thinking.

There cannot be a more despicable creature, than the *fantastical* fop; he tricks out his charming self, in hopes of attracting the respect of mankind; but, on the contrary, meets, only, with scorn and contempt. The *whimsical* man,
if

if his invention be fertile, is, sometimes, an object of present admiration; but, on serious reflection, is, too frequently, the subject of ridicule. A *maggotty* person, is, equally, tiresome to himself and to others; as what pleases him, one minute, shall, often, displease him, the next. He, who is *fanciful*, is far more troublesome to himself, than to others; for being led away by his wild imagination, he, fondly, believes many things to be real, which, in fact are, only, ideal.

I43.

Capacity,
Ability.

Capacity, has more relation to the knowledge of things; *ability*, to their application. The one, is acquired, by study; the other, by practice.

He, who has *capacity* for a thing, is proper to undertake; he, who has *ability*, to execute.

I44.

Little,
Small.

The word, *little*, sometimes, signifies, only, want of bigness; and, at other times, want of greatness, in every sense; whereas that of *small*, is the opposite, only, to bigness, and, supposes some kind of length. Thus, we say, a *little* house;

house; a *little* man; a *little* cup; a *little* globe:
but, a *small* thread; a *small* line; a *small*
twig.

145.

To Remark,
Observe.

To *remark*, implies, taking notice, with attention, in order, to remember: to *observe*, means, rather, to watch, with examination, by way of passing our judgement.

The traveller *remarks*, that, which strikes him most; the spy, *observes* those proceedings, which he thinks of consequence.

It is the part of a general to *remark* those, of his men, who distinguish themselves in battle; and, *observe* the motions, of the enemy.

We may *observe*, in order, to *remark*; but custom will not admit of an inversion of the phrase.

Those, who *observe* the conduct of others, in order, to *remark* their faults; do it, rather, through a delight in censuring, than, a desire of correcting their own errors.

146.

To go back,
Return.

We go back, from a place, where we have, some considerable time, been. We return, to a place, we had, just before left. Thus, we say, he

he is *gone back* into his own country. He is *returned* home. We say, also, he is *gone back* from virtue; he has *returned* to his fault.

147.

Idea,
Thought,

|

Imagination,
Notion.

The *idea*, represents the object; *thought*, considers it; *imagination*, forms it; thus worked up, it becomes a *notion*. The first, only, points; the second, examines; the third, seduces; but, the last, draws.

When in conversation, our *ideas* are just; our *thoughts*, fine; and, our *imagination*s, brilliant; we shall be sure to please: and, our *notions*, tho' singular, will, always, be respectable.

148.

Business,
Affairs.

Business, implies, an object of industry; *affairs*, an object of concern. The first, employs the hands; the second, the mind. The word, *business*, by its having no plural number, intimates a particular employ; by the singular of *affairs*, being seldom in use, in the sense before us, that word is understood to mean, a variety of transactions.

The man of much *business*, ought to have a strong constitution. He, who has many *affairs*
to

to settle, tho' he may have a clear head, will find it difficult, to adjust them all, to his satisfaction.

He, who, continually, interferes with the *business* of others, neglecting his own *affairs*, makes himself an object of ridicule; and, merits the contempt of mankind.

149.

To *Take*,
Choose.

When we would *take* a thing, we determine upon one, because, we cannot have all. We *choose*, by comparing things, because, we would have the best. The one, supposes a simple determination of the will; the other, a discernment of the mind.

Between two things, exactly alike, we may determine, which to *take*, when at the same time, there is no *choice*.

We are sometimes constrained to *take* one thing, out of many, when we are not obliged to *choose*.

We cannot use the word *take*, but, with respect to ourselves; but we *choose*, sometimes, for others.

It is a point of good-manners, when offered fruit or any other thing, where there is *choice*; to *take*; that, which comes first to hand: but, when we would present any thing of the like sort, to a stranger, it is a mark of politeness, to *choose* for him the best.

When things are at our *option*, that is, when we may *take*, which we please; we should try to make a good *choice*.

Between

Between a good course of life and a bad, there is no medium ; we must either *take* the one or the other. Nothing appears more difficult to me, than the *choice* of a friend.

If, in a journey, there were, only, two roads, to *take* ; the one, short, but, bad ; the other, long, but, good ; I should, certainly, *choose* the last.

150.

To *Choose*,
Make choice of.

The word, *choose*, is most, in its place, with respect to things, we would make use of. The expression, *make choice of*, is, more proper, when it relates to persons, we would appoint to any dignity or employ.

George, the third, *chose*, the Queen's palace, as his place of residence in town ; and, *made choice of* Cæsar Hawkins, to inoculate his children.

To *choose*, indicates, more particularly, a comparison made between things, in order, to know, which is best to take ; to *make choice of*, marks with greater precision, the simple determination of one person preferable to another.

Princes do not, always, *choose* their ministers ; neither, do they, always, *make choice of* a Talbot, for a chancellor ; nor, a Marlborough, for a general.

151.

To *Choose*,
Prefer.

We do not, always, *choose*, what, we *prefer*: but, we ever *prefer*, that, which we *choose*.

To *choose*, is, to determine in favour of a thing, either on account of its merit, or, its value. To *prefer*, is, to determine in its favour, by any motive whatsoever; whether it be merit, affection, good-manners, policy, or, what not.

'Tis the judgment, that makes the *choice*; the heart, that gives the *preference*. 'Tis for this reason, that we, commonly, *choose*, what, we are acquainted with; and, *prefer*, what, we love.

Prudence, sometimes, forbids our *choosing* that, which strikes the eye most. Justice will not, often, permit us to *prefer* our friends, to other people.

In *choosing* a state of life, I think there can be no harm in *preferring* that, which is most agreeable to our inclinations; as, in so doing, we should, naturally, find more satisfaction in our duty.

Choice, is either good or bad, according to our taste, or, the knowledge we have in things. *Preference*, is, either just or unjust, as reason dictates, or, passion inspires.

Partial *preference*, is, sometimes, allowed to princes in the distribution of their honours; but, they should, always, make *choice* of the ablest men, in their appointments to public offices.

G

152. *Meat*,

152.

Meat,
Flesh.

By the word, *Meat*, is understood, any kind of food; but *flesh*, signifies, only, the natural composition of an animal. Thus, we say, that fish and vegetables are proper *meats* for Lent; and, that the *flesh* of a partridge, is very white and tender.

Grain is the *meat* of birds; *flesh*, the food of beasts.

153.

Reformation,
Reform.

Reformation, signifies, often, the action of reforming; *reform*, seldom any other than, the effect.

A general *reformation* of manners, among the people, will ever be found a very difficult and laborious task. When we have not been able to complete a thing to our satisfaction, by any sort of amendment, we have, often, brought it to bear, by a thorough *reform*.

154. *Smooth,*

154.

*Smooth,
Level.*

That, which is not rough, is *smooth*. That, which is free from either hollows or risings, is *level*.

The *smoothest* marble is the best. A country, where there is neither hills nor valleys, is *level*.

155.

*To Fade,
Wither.*

Of these two words, *with*, rises upon that of *fade*. A flower, which is *faded*, may recover ; but, that, which is *withered*, can not.

Beauty, like a flower, *fades* through length of time ; and may *with*, suddenly, by an accident.

156.

*Prerogative,
Privilege.*

Prerogative, relates to honour, and personal preference ; it rises principally, from subordination, or, from the relation, persons bear among themselves : whereas, *privilege*, implies, some advantage from interest or office, proceeding

from the grant of a prince, or, the laws of a society.

Birth, gives *prerogatives*. Offices, give *privileges*.

157.

Knowing,
Discerning.

The *knowing* man, acts surely, he seldom deceives himself; yet, knowledge of life, only, is his fort. The *discerning* man, is clear-sighted and judicious, sees thro' the artifices of mankind, with half an eye, and, will not suffer himself to be deceived; his great abilities consist, in distinguishing.

The study of man, will make a person *knowing*; but, it requires great experience, and, a long attention, both to men and books, to render him *discerning*.

An artful, ingenious rogue, will, sometimes, take in the *knowing*, by a novel deceit; through the fallacy of which, the *discerning* man, shall, readily, penetrate.

158.

Order,
Regularity.

Each, of these words, implies, a prudent disposition of things; but, that, of *order*, relates, more, to the effect, which results from such a disposition;

disposition; that, of *regularity*, more, to the power, and, to the model, that conducts that disposition.

We observe *order*, in conformance to *regularity*. The first, is the effect, of the second.

159.

Traffic,
Trade,
Commerce.

Traffic, relates, more, to the exchange of merchandize; *trade*, and, *commerce*, to that, of buying and selling; with this difference, that *trade*, seems to imply the manufacturing and vending of merchandise within ourselves; *commerce*, negotiating with other countries.

We *traffic*, with nations, that have not the use of money; by bartering one kind of merchandise, for another. *Trade*, is looked upon by the wisest of men, to be the support of every state; as the prosperity of a kingdom depends, in a great measure, upon its riches; and, riches, is the immediate effect of *trade*. The great and extensive *commerce*, that England holds with other nations, makes us, the glory and admiration of the world.

160. *Exchange,*

160.

Exchange,
Truck,
Barter.

The word, *exchange*, means, simply, in a general sense, the act of exchanging one thing for another, be it, what it may: the other two, are in use to denominate the particular kinds or methods of *exchange*; of which, this is the difference, that, the word, *truck*, is used, with most propriety, when speaking of serviceable things, such as are moveable; as the *trucking* of horses, trinkets, utensils, &c. Whereas, *barter*, is a more mercantile expression, and intimates the *exchange* of different commodities, by way of traffic. Thus, so little are the natives of Guinea acquainted, with the value of gold, that, they hold commerce with other nations, by *bartering* it away for glass, and, other trifling ornaments.

161.

Regard,
Esteem,

Veneration,
Respect.

When we entertain a good opinion of a man, we are said, to *regard* him; when that *regard* increases, we call it *esteem*; we testify that *esteem*, by *veneration*; and prove it, by submission, through *respect*.

We have a natural *regard* for a quiet neighbour; we *esteem* him if he studies the good of the neighbourhood;

neighbourhood; if we perceive in him any eminent qualities, we hold him in *veneration*; and, in proportion, to the rank he is in above us, either by birth or fortune, we treat him, with less or greater *respect*.

Being born in the same country, claims *regard*. Civility creates *esteem*. Age and merit, render *venerable*; rank and dignity, *respectable*.

162.

Retinue,
Train.

Retinue, implies, a number of followers; *train*, the same, with order. Thus, his coach was attended, with so great a *retinue*, that, there was no seeing the carriage, for dust. It was customary, in a Roman triumph, to have, always, a number of captive slaves, in the *train*.

163.

Occasion,
Occurrence,
Conjuncture,

Case,
Circumstance.

Occasion, is used, for the arrival of something new, whether it be that, which presents itself, or what, we seek; and, in a sense, as indeterminate with respect to time, as the object. *Occurrence*, is, only, in use, to express that, which happens unexpectedly, and with relation to the time present. We make use of the word, *conjuncture*, to mark a situation

situation proceeding from a concurrence of events, whether of business or interest. *Case*, is employed to signify, the main point, with a special reference to the sort and singularity of the thing in question. *Circumstance*, carries with it no other idea, than that of something additional, accompanying another, which is principal.

We know people on particular *occasions*. We should demean ourselves, according to the *occurrence* of the times. It is, commonly, the *conjunction*, that determines us, which side to take. It has been pretended, that there are *cases*, in which, reason would condemn, even an attention to virtue. Diversity of *circumstances*, will make the same man, think differently, upon the same subject.

164.

Uncertainty,
Doubt,
Suspence.

In that sense, in which, these words are accounted synonymous, they, all three, imply indetermination: but, *uncertainty* rises, when the event of things is unknown. *Doubt*, when the mind knows not how to choose. By *suspence*, is understood, an indetermined state, when the mind is held in expectation.

We are in *uncertainty*, with respect to the success of our proceedings; in *doubt*, what step to take; in *suspence*, when we are held from acting, by a delay of certainty.

Uncertainty,

Uncertainty, requires caution ; *doubt*, consideration ; *suspence*, patience.

A wise man is seldom *uncertain*, as to what shall happen ; he foresees future events, and prepares himself for them. When we are in *doubt*, and at a loss to determine ; we should leave the matter to the decision of others. Of all states of indetermination, that of *suspence*, is the most vexatious, and the only remedy, is a quiet resignation.

165.

Right,
Justice.

Right, is the object of *justice* ; and that, which is due to every one. *Justice*, is the conformity of our actions, with *right* ; it is to render and secure to every one that which is his due. The first, is dictated by nature, or, established by authority, either divine or human ; and is, according to circumstances, sometimes, liable to change. The second, is the rule, we should, always, follow, and is, ever, invariable.

It is consistent with the laws of *justice*, to use the same means, in support and defence of our *rights*, as are, often, employed to attack them.

166.

*Dejected,
Melancholy,*

*Low-spirited,
Dull.*

Dejection, is, commonly, caused by great affliction, and is, too often, a mark of despair. *Melancholy*, is, generally, the effect of constitution; its cloudy ideas overpower and banish all that are chearful. *Low-spiritedness*, is involuntary, and, often, proceeds from a weakness of nerves: excess of joy, fatigue, bad digestion, will occasion it. *Dullness*, on the contrary, is voluntary; it arises, frequently, from discontent, disappointment, and from any other circumstance that may displease the mind.

The mind, in *dejection*, is unhappy, not having sufficient strength and reason to get the better of it. *Melancholy*, will, sometimes, wear away, by frequent diversion and dissipation. A person, subject to *low-spirits*, should pursue a regular course of life, and a uniform method of living. *Dullness* is encreased by giving way to it; it is in our power to banish it, whenever we please, and the damp it throws on every company, one would imagine, should be our greatest inducement, to do it.

The reverse of *dejection*, is joy; the reverse of *melancholy*, chearfulness; gaiety is the opposite, to *low-spiritedness*; and sprightliness, to *dullness*.

167.

*Piercing,
Penetrating.*

The word, *piercing*, implies, great strength of sight, and, a stroke of the eye; that, of *penetrating*, great force of attention, and, reflexion.

A *piercing* mind, sees things, even, through the veils, that cover them; it is difficult, to conceal truth from it; it will not suffer itself, to be deceived. A mind that *penetrates*, reaches to the bottom of things, without stopping at the surface; it is not easy to deceive it, neither will it suffer itself, to be amused.

Besides the above distinction, *piercing*, seems to be executed, by a sudden glance; *penetrating*, by making way gradually.

168.

To *Put,
Place.*

Put, seems to have a general sense; *place*, one more limited, meaning to *put*, orderly, and, in a proper place.

We *put* columns, to support an edifice: we *place* them, with symmetry.

169. *Discernment,*

169.

*Discernment,
Judgment.*

Discernment, relates, not only, to a thing itself, but, also, to its appearances ; and, is a distinguishing knowledge, that prevents the confounding of one thing, with another. *Judgment*, relates to a thing considered in itself, only, in order, to investigate the truth ; and, is a knowledge that determines. The first, is limited to things present ; its office is to discern truth from falsehood, perfections from defects, motives from pretexts : the second, pries, even, into futurity ; discovers the relation, and, consequence of things, foreseeing their effects. In short, we may say, of *discernment*, that, it is knowing ; that, it renders our ideas, just ; and, of *judgment*, that, it is wise ; that, it makes our conduct, discreet.

When choice, or, determination, with respect to the goodness, or, beauty of objects, is in question, we should have recourse to those, who have *discernment*. When we would take any step of consequence, we should take the advice of such persons, as have *judgment*.

Arts and sciences require *discernment* ; which is, more or less nice, according to the delicacy of the understanding, or, the extent of knowledge. Government, and, the policy of states demands *judgment* ; which is, more or less, sure, according to the force of reason, and, the length of experience.

170. *Satisfied,*

170.

*Satisfied,
Contented.*

We are *satisfied*, when, we have obtained, what we wished for: We are *contented*, when, we wish not for any more.

It happens, often, that, when, well *satisfied*, we are not the more *content*.

Possession will, always, prove *satisfactory*; but it is the true enjoyment, only, of what we possess, that can make us *content*.

171.

*Tale,
Novel,*

|

*Romance,
Story.*

Each, of these words, implies, a small history, or, an entertaining relation of adventures: the three first, are supposed to be fabulous, and, made public; whereas, the last, may be either true, or, feigned, and told either in print, or, by word of mouth; but, as they carry ideas peculiar to themselves, it is my business, to point them out: by the word, *tale*, then, is meant, a short, but dressed-up narrative of some single adventure; that, of *novel*, signifies, an amusing history, made up of many adventures, and, carried on through one, or, more volumes. By *romance*, is understood, a collection of wild adventures, in love and war.

Tales,

Tales, ought to be well related; *novels*, well invented; *romances*, well carried on; *stories*, well told.

Tales, if attended with good morals, are not, only, amusing, but, instructive. *Novels*, are of no other use, than to entertain; they waste the time, without making the least improvement. *Romances* spoil the taste of young people, who, by an attention to them, are apt to prefer the marvellous, to the natural and simple truth. A droll *story*, told with humour, is a great enlivener of company.

172.

Continuance,
Continuation.

Continuance, relates to duration; *continuation*, to extent.

We should study a conscientious discharge of our duty, during our *continuance* in any office. The several books, contained in the volume of *Paradise Lost*, are *continuations*, of the same subject.

173.

Continual.
Continued.

There may be an interruption in that, which is *continual*; but that, which is *continued*, will not admit of it. So that the first of these words, denotes

notes properly, the length of duration, although, there may be intervals, and, different renewals; and, the second, marks simply, the unity of that duration, independent either of length, or shortness of the time; it is, for this reason, we say, a *continual* noise; *continual* rains; but, a *continued* stream; and, in music, a *continued* base.

Continual interruptions will make us weary of the best undertakings. In countries, situated near the poles, there is, for the space of five or six months together, one *continued* darkness, inso-much, that the inhabitants, during that time, are obliged to leave the place.

174.

To *Bid*,
Order.

The first, of these, is extremely general, the other more limited. To *bid*, intimates, direction to perform, whether the person directing, has any authority for so doing, or, not. To *order*, implies, the exercise of authority.

Some people are so very officious, that they are, always, ready to do, what they are *bid*, whether the thing be right or wrong, or, the person *bidding*, be impowered, to *order* them, or, not.

175. Yet,

175.

*Yet,
In the mean while,*

*However,
Nevertheless.*

Yet, seems, to have more force and energy; it assures, with firmness, in spite of every opposition. *In the mean while*, is less absolute, it affirms, only, against contrary appearances. *However*, distinguishes two things, which seem opposite; supporting one without hurting the other. *Nevertheless*, affirms a thing, by exception; giving us to understand, that it does not occur, but, at the time, we are speaking.

Though the whole earth is in arms against truth, *yet*, it does not prevent its triumphing. Some parents are very strict, with respect to the morals of their children; *in the mean while*, will indulge themselves, in every thing, their own heart can wish. Addison was a wretched speaker, *however*, he was an excellent author. Churchill, every one knows, was a bad liver; *nevertheless*, he was of some service to his country, by ridiculing vice, and lashing venality.

176.

*Excellency,
Excellence.*

Notwithstanding these words are, evidently, the same, *excellence*, being no other than *excellencie*, contracted, or, the redundant syllable, general in old writing, taken away; yet, custom seems

to have applied *excellency*, to express the title of a governour, or, that of an ambassador, from one prince, to another, whereas, by *excellence*, is understood, the state of abounding in any good quality.

177.

Pride,
Arrogance,
Vanity,

Presumption,
Haughtiness.

Pride, is, unreasonable or inordinate self-esteem. *Arrogance*, implies, taking much upon ourselves, and, is *pride* attended with insolence and contempt. *Vanity*, is accompanied with affectation, and, means, *pride*, exerted, on slight grounds. By *presumption*, is understood, a blind, and, adventurous confidence; with respect to *haughtiness*, it is a mixture of softness and insolence, the immediate effect of *pride*.

The *haughtiness* of the *proud* man, is insufferable. *Pride* makes us value ourselves; *arrogance*, despise others: Through *vanity*, we covet the attention of our acquaintance. *Presumption* flatters us, with having a vain power.

The *proud*, consider themselves, in their own mind; full, and, self-swoln, they are taken up, with their own person. The *arrogant*, claim to themselves, what they have not the least pretensions to, are ready to insult those, who will not allow them, what they claim; and look down, on the rest of the world, with contempt. The *vain*, value themselves, upon the opinion of others; greedy of esteem, they are eager, to engross the
attention

attention of all mankind. The *presumptuous*, carry their audacious hopes, even to chimeras; bold, to undertake, they, fondly, imagine they have power to do every thing.

The greatest pain, we can, possibly, give the *proud* man, is, by laying his defects, before his eyes. We cannot hurt the *arrogant*, so much, as by silent contempt. We cannot mortify a *vain* man more, than by paying no attention, to those qualifications or qualities, he prides himself in. In order to confound the *presumptuous*, we need, only, desire him, to put his *vain* designs in execution.

178.

Cure,
Remedy.

We perform a *cure*. We procure a *remedy*. The first, relates more to the malady, and, to the action of him, who heals it; the second, has more relation to health, and, the state of the malady, we heal. We say, of a *cure*, that, it is fine; when its success, does honour to the person, who formed it; and, we say, of a *remedy*, that, it is certain, or, sure; when its operations are efficacious; that is, when it produces those consequences, we intended; and, we say of both, that, they are, either, easy, or, difficult.

Cure, seems to have no other object, than stubborn disorders, and those, which proceed from constitution; whereas, *remedy*, has a view to slight complaints, and, such, as are of short duration.

The

The more inveterate the disorder, the more difficult the *cure*; in many cases, regular living, is the best *remedy*.

The word *cure*, is, often, considered, as the effect of *remedy*. Some *remedies*, will complete a *cure*, much sooner than others.

Incurable disorders, are not, only, those, where the *cure* is absolutely impossible; but, such, as, for which, no *remedy* can be found.

179.

Haughtiness,
Disdain.

Both these words, denote, a disposition, that prevents affability, and keeps us at a distance from those, whom we think beneath us, either in birth, fortune, or, abilities, with this difference, that *haughtiness* is founded upon the esteem, a man has for himself; and, *disdain*, upon the disesteem, he has for others.

Haughtiness, is seldom met with, but in persons of weak understanding, and, those, who have had a bad education. There are, a sort of vain people, who look upon *disdain*, as a personal accomplishment; and, who use it on all occasions, as, a test of the merit, they pretend to.

180. *Sloth,*

180.

Sloth,
Lazinefs,
Sluggishness.

Sloth and *lazinefs*, are voluntary, with this difference, that *sloth*, implies, utter inactivity, an absolute aversion to work; *lazinefs*, an inclination, but, a fear of trouble and fatigue: whereas, *sluggishness*, is, often, involuntary; proceeding, sometimes, from constitution, and, is discovered, by its dull, heavy method of acting.

The *slothful* man, will not work, at all. The *lazy* man, is drawn to it, with difficulty. The *sluggish* man is slow, through the whole operation.

Industry, is the reverse of *sloth*; activity, of *lazinefs*; expedition, of *sluggishness*.

He, who is *slothful*, is a murderer of time. *Lazinefs*, is its own punishment. A *sluggish* person, is fit for no kind of employment, seldom doing any thing well, he undertakes.

181.

Harm,
Hurt,
Injury,

Detriment,
Mischief.

These words, imply, some kind of ill, happening to a man's person, character, or, property. Those of *harm*, and, *hurt*, relate more to the person,

person, or, character; with this difference, that *harm*, seems to denote, a small degree of *hurt*; *hurt*, a great degree of *harm*. *Mischief*, implies, ill, to the person, or, property, and appears, ever, to be done, with an evil intent. *Injury*, intimates, a degree of *hurt*, without justice; and relates to the character, or, property. *Detriment*, carries an idea of loss, and, is seldom used, but, with, regard to property.

By wounding a man, more or less, we *harm*, or, *hurt*, his person. By speaking ill of him, deservedly or not, we *harm*, or, *hurt*, his character: by breaking his head, or, setting fire to his house, we are said to do him a *mischief*. By taking away his good name, we *injure* his character: by defrauding him of his goods, we *injure* him in his property. By breaking a hedge, or, treading down of corn, we do a great deal of *detriment*.

182.

Quickly,
Soon,
Speedily.

The word *quickly*, seems, more proper, to express the motion, with which, we act; its reverse, is, slowly. The word, *soon*, respects the time, when the action is performed; its reverse, is, late. The word, *speedily*, has a greater relation to the time, we employ about a thing; its reverse, is, long-time.

We advance the more by going *quick*; but, we go surely, by going slowly. Wickedness is, always, punished, either, *sooner*, or later. It is necessary,

necessary, to be a long-time deliberating; but, we should execute *speedily*.

He, who begins *soon*, and, works *quick*; will *speedily*, have done.

183.

Affiduous,
Expeditious,
Quick.

When we are *affiduous*, at work, we lose no time; when *expeditious*, we defer not, but finish immediately; when *quick*, we work with activity. Idleness, delay, and slowness, are the three defects, opposite to these three good qualities.

An *affiduous* man, thinks nothing of the trouble of what he takes in hand. An *expeditious* man, will not quit his work. One that is *quick*, will presently, have done.

We should be *affiduous*, in what we undertake; *expeditious*, in affairs, that require to be soon ended; and *quick*, in the execution of orders.

184.

<i>Now,</i>		<i>Immediately,</i>
<i>Instantly,</i>		<i>Presently.</i>

The doing a thing *now*, expresses the taking it in hand, at that very instant; the other three words, as they are here placed, express a time farther and farther off. *Instantly*, implies, without any perceptible intervention of time. *Immediately,*

diately, means, without delay. By *presently*, is understood, soon after.

185.

*Fashion,
Custom.*

These two words, like many others, I have taken notice of, tho' they may not strike the reader, at first sight, as words, reputed synonymous; have, nevertheless, been used as such, by some of our best writers, and, are, at present: it is therefore necessary, to point out the difference between them. *Fashion*, then, seems, more universal; *custom*, more ancient: that, which the greater part of the people practise, is, a *fashion*; that, which has been practised a long time, is, a *custom*.

Fashion, introduces itself, and, extends daily; *custom*, establishes itself, and, gains authority; the first, forms the mode; the second, a usage: each, is a kind of law, independent on reason, with respect to that, which relates to our outward actions.

There is, sometimes, more policy in conforming to a bad *fashion*; than being singular in some good things. Many persons follow *custom*, even in their way of thinking; imbibing the notions of their mothers and nurses.

186. *Variation,*

186.

*Variation,
Change.*

Variation, consists in being, as much of one sort, as another: *Change*, consists, only, in ceasing to be the same.

We *vary* in our sentiments, when, we give them up, and, embrace them again. We *change* our opinions, when, we reject one, in order, to embrace another.

He, who has no certain principles, is liable to *vary*. He, who is more attached to fortune, than truth, will find no difficulty in *changing* his doctrine.

187.

*Variation,
Variety.*

Successive changes, in the same subject, make *variation*: A multitude of different objects, forms *variety*. Thus, we say, the *variation* of time; *variety* of colours.

There is no government, but, is subject to *variation*. There is no species in nature, in which, we may not observe great *variety*.

188.

Track,
Footstep.

Track, is more general; meaning, any mark left on the way, of whatever passed. *Footstep*, is more limited; implying, the print of the feet. Thus, we say, the *track* of a horse, or, a carriage; but, the *footsteps*, of a man.

189.

Fickle,
Inconstancy.

| *Unsteady,*
Changeable.

The attachments, of the *fickle* man, are slight; those, of the *inconstant*, of short duration. As to the words, *unsteady*, and, *changeable*, they imply, an aversion in adhering to the same thing; with this difference, that the *unsteady* man, is, eager to enjoy many things; the *changeable* man, is, in constant search of different ones.

Men, are, commonly, more *fickle* and *inconstant*, than women; but women, more *unsteady* and *changeable*, than men. The first, err thro' indifference; the second, thro' a love of novelty. Consequently, it is a merit, in men, to persevere; and in women, to resist.

190.

*Rogue,
Sharper,
Thief.*

These are all persons, who steal what does not belong to them; with this difference, that the *rogue*, steals in secret; he pilfers. The *sharp*, steals, by finesse; he over-reaches. The *thief*, steals, by all manner of means, robbing by force and violence.

The *rogue*, fears to be discovered; the *sharp*, to be known again; and the *thief*, to be taken.

191.

*Intention,
Design.*

Intention, is, a disposition or inclination of the mind, to something at a distance; its characteristic, is to aim. *Design*, seems to suppose, something studied and methodical; it is employed, in searching out the means of execution.

Intentions, are more secret and vague; *designs*, more extensive, and, more rational.

Intention, is the soul of action, and, the spring of true worth. *Design*, is, the effect of reflection.

As, no one cares to be balked in his *intentions*, or, crossed in his *designs*; we should have no other *intention*, than, to do our duty; nor, any other

other *design*, than, to conform to the will of Providence.

Nothing is less followed, than, the original *intention* of charitable foundations. Nothing has been found more difficult to accomplish, than, the *design* of bringing about a thorough reformation of manners.

That man is, truly, great, who is right in his *intentions*, and, reasonable, in his *designs*.

192.

*Unpolite,
Clownish.*

It is a much greater defect, to be *clownish*, than, to be, barely, *unpolite*.

Unpoliteness, is, want of good-manners: it does not please. *Clownishness*, is, a mixture of ill-manners: it displeases.

Clownishness, proceeds, from an entire want of education: *unpoliteness*, is owing to a bad one.

193.

*To Tolerate,
Suffer,
Permit.*

We *tolerate* a thing, when, knowing it, and, having sufficient power, we do not hinder it. We *suffer* it, by making no opposition, but, seeming, either, not to know it, or, not to have the power

of preventing it. We *permit* it, when we authorise it, by formal consent.

The words, *tolerate* and *suffer*, are never used, but, with respect to bad things, or, such, as we believe so; whereas, the word *permit*, relates, either, to good or bad.

The legislative power is, sometimes, obliged to *tolerate* certain evils, in order, to prevent worse. It is, sometimes, prudence, to *suffer*, even, abuse in the discipline of the church, rather, than destroy its unity. Human laws never will *permit*, what the divine law forbids; but, sometimes, forbids, what the other will *permit*.

194.

Gay,
Merry,
Diverting.

We are *gay*, by disposition; *merry*, through turn of mind; *diverting*, by our way of acting. Sad, serious, and, tiresome, are, exactly, their opposites.

Our *gaiety* turns almost, entirely, to our own advantage: our *merriment*, at the same time, that it is agreeable to others, it is no less so to ourselves; but, our being *diverting*, is enjoyed, only, by the company.

A *gay* man, will laugh himself; a *merry* man, is good company; a *diverting* man, will make us laugh.

We should, if possible, suppress our *gaiety*, when, in the house of affliction. We should
cease

cease to be *merry*, when, others are sad. We should take care not to be *diverting*, at the expence of our character, or, good-sense.

195.

Enmity, .

Rancour.

Enmity, is more declared ; it seems, always, open. *Rancour*, is more contealed ; it, generally, dissembles.

Bad services, and, rude language, create *enmity* ; which never ceases, 'till tired out with punishing ; or, a reconciliation is brought about, by the intercession of friends. Remembrance of injuries, or, affronts received, keeps *rancour* alive in the breast ; which never subsides, while there is the least thirst of vengeance ; or, 'till we pardon, sincerely.

Enmity, does not, always, destroy our esteem for an enemy, nor, prevent our doing him the justice, he is entitled to ; but, it will not admit of our caressing him, or, doing him any good, otherwise, than through a sense of honour, or, greatness of soul ; to which, we, sometimes, sacrifice our vengeance. *Rancour*, makes us embrace, with pleasure, every opportunity of revenging ourselves ; but, can hide itself, with the cloak of friendship, 'till the very moment it begins to act.

Enmity is, sometimes, noble, and it would be mean not to conceive it, against certain persons ; but, *rancour* is, always, low.

A settled

A settled *enmity* in families, sometimes, runs through many generations ; and will not cease, 'till time shall obliterate it. Perfect reconciliations are very rare ; there remaining, often, a great deal of *rancour*, in the breasts of those, who seem most sincere.

A philosopher should have no object of *enmity*, but, the disturbers of public tranquillity. If *rancour* can, in any case, be excusable, it must be, with respect to traitors ; their crime, being too black, to be thought of, without indignation.

196.

To *Insinuate*,
Suggest.

We *insinuate*, by cunning, and, address ; we *suggest*, by credit, and, artifice.

In order, to *insinuate*, we must consult both time and opportunity ; in order, to *suggest*, it is necessary, to have ascendancy over the minds of persons.

Insinuate, implies, something delicate : *suggest*, frequently, something fraudulent.

We cover, artfully, what we would *insinuate* : and, what we would *suggest*, we make of some consequence.

We, often, imagine that, what, others *insinuate*, was first thought of, by ourselves. He, who *suggests* evil to another, is much more culpable, than he, who commits it.

197. Ordinary,

197.

Ordinary,
Common.

These words, have been reputed synonymous, in two senses; as implying, frequent use; and, meaning, of little or no value: but, they are different in both. In the first sense, the word, *ordinary*, seems to me, to be best applied, when the repetition of actions, is in question; *common*, when a multitude of objects. Thus, nothing is more *ordinary* at court, than dissimulation. Monsters are *common* in Africa.

In the second, that, which is *ordinary*, has nothing, to distinguish it; that, which is *common*, has nothing, to make it sought after.

189.

To Hear,
Hearken.

To hear, implies, having the ear struck with any sound. *To hearken*, means, to lend an ear, in order, to *hear*. Sometimes, we *hear*, without *hearkening*; and, we, often, *hearken*, without *hearing*.

199. To

199.

To *Understand*,
Comprehend,
Conceive.

To have just and proper ideas of every thing, that occurs, is the common signification of these words: but, to *understand*, implies, a conformity of ideas, which has a peculiar relation to the value of the terms, we use; to *comprehend*, denotes, such a conformity, as answers directly, to the nature of the things, we explain; and that, which is expressed by the word, *conceive*, relates, more especially, to the order and design, of what, we propose. The first, is used, with propriety, when, applied to the particulars, of what, we say; the tone, with which, we speak; the turn of our phrases; and, the delicacy of our expressions. The second, seems to agree best, with a relation to principles, lessons, precepts, and, speculative knowledge. The third, appears with greater elegance, when, it relates to forms, arrangement, projects, and, plans; in short, all that depends on the imagination.

We *understand* languages. We *comprehend* sciences. We *conceive*, whatever has relation to arts.

It is difficult to *understand* that, which is enigmatical; to *comprehend* that, which is abstruse; and, to *conceive* that, which is confused.

Readiness of *understanding*, is a mark of acuteness; that, of *comprehension*, is, a proof of penetration; that, of *conception*, denotes, a clear head.

A lover

A lover *understands* the language of the passions. A learned man, *comprehends* the metaphysical questions of the schools. An architect, *conceives* the plan and œconomy of buildings.

200.

*Fashion,**Figure,**Form.*

Fashion, rises from labour, and, results from the workmanship; the workman, enriching it, more or less, according to his taste. *Figure*, springs from design, and, results from the outlines of the thing; the author of the plan, making it, either more or less, regular, according to his abilities. *Form*, rises from construction, and, results, from the arrangement of parts; the conductor of the work, making it, more or less, natural, as his imagination directs him.

The *fashion* of a work, frequently, exceeds in value, the price of the materials. We seldom give in architecture a round *figure* to any thing, except, to single pieces, and, such as stand by themselves. Paganism pictures the Deity, under all kinds of *forms*; whereas, Christianity confines it to those, of a man, and, of a dove.

We say of *fashion*, that it is, either, pretty, or, ugly; of *figure*, that it is, either, agreeable, or, disagreeable; of *form*, that, it is, either, common, or, uncommon.

201.

Fault,
Defect,
Imperfection.

Fault, includes in its idea, a relation to the maker; so that, while it implies, some real want, in the finishing of the work, it denotes, also, that, it was owing to the workman. *Defect*, expresses something *imperfect*, in the thing, without any relation to the maker of it. *Imperfection*, intimates, something of less consequence, than is understood by the preceding words, and, is used, with more propriety, in morality, than either, in physics, or, mechanics.

The smoaking of chimneys, is a great *fault* in houses; as, a little attention in the builder, may easily prevent it. When the beauty of a building is spoiled, for want of room, or, proper materials, it is a *defect*, which the builder could not prevent. *Imperfections*, are considered by the bigotted religionist, as real sins; but, reasonable christians, look upon them, only, as the natural consequents of frail humanity.

202.

Fault,
Crime.

Faults, result from human weakness; being transgressions of the rules of duty. *Crimes*, proceed

ceed from the wickedness of the heart; being actions, against the rules of nature.

The effects of anger, and, the intrigues of gallantry, are *faults*. Calumnies, and, assassinations, are *crimes*.

It is our indispensable duty, to pardon *faults*; but, punish *crimes*.

203.

To Oblige,
Constrain,

|

To Compel,
Force.

The last of these words, rises upon the third, as the third does, upon the second, and, the second, upon the first; each of them, implying, an opposition to liberty. The word, *oblige*, relates more to duty, or, necessity; intimating, a power acting on us, in conformity to our inclinations: *constrain*, refers to those troublesome oppositions, that make us determine, against our inclinations; *compel*, alludes to power and authority, which makes us act, in express contrariety to our will, which, we lament the not being master of: the word, *force*, implies, contrary efforts of a vigorous action, which, we try to resist, but, in vain.

The duty of a child, to its parents, *oblige*s it, to assist him, in his old-age. The weaker and softer sex, is that, which can least brook *constraint*. There are, some, occasions, on which we should not be sorry, to be *compelled*, even to that, we are most unwilling to do. Ancient politeness of the table, went so far, as, to *force* guests to eat and drink.

204. *Heaviness,*

204.

*Heaviness,
Weight.*

In the figurative sense, the difference of these words, is so extremely great, as to need no pointing out; in the literal, indeed, they are, often, confounded; considered then, in this last sense, *heaviness*, is that quality in a body, which we feel, and, distinguish by itself: *weight*, is the measure and degree of that quality, which we cannot ascertain, but, by comparison.

We say, absolutely, and, in an undetermined sense, that a thing is *heavy*; but relatively, and, in a manner determined, that, it is of such a *weight*, for example, of two, three, or, four pounds.

A thousand circumstances, prove the *heaviness* of the air; and, the mercury, determines its exact *weight*.

205.

*To Return,
Surrender,
Restore.*

We are said, to *return*, what has been lent or given us: to *surrender*, what we have in pledge or charge: to *restore*, what we have taken or stolen.

We ought to *return*, punctually; to *surrender*, faithfully; and, to *restore*, wholly.

We

We borrow, with an intent to *return*; we take a thing in charge, with a view of *surrendering* it again; but, we seldom take, with a design to *restore*.

Custom makes use of these words, on the following occasions; the first, with respect to civility, favours, presents, or, testimonies of kindness: the second, with respect to what, we are entrusted with; honours, employs, or, offices, with which we are invested: the third, with relation to things taken away, that have been our due. Thus, we *return* money, that has been lent us; presents, we have received; and, letters, to a deserted sweet-heart: we *surrender* a child, to its parents; the ribbon of an order, the staff of command, seals, and, dignities to a prince; we *restore*, an accused person, when found innocent, to his estates and honours; and, a minor, to the possession of his effects, which have been held from him.

206.

Sincerity,
Frankness,

| *Plainness,*
Ingenuousness.

Sincerity, prevents our speaking, otherwise, than we think; and, is a virtue. *Frankness*, makes us speak, as we think; and, is a natural effect. *Plainness*, is, speaking, freely, what we think; and, springs, sometimes, from want of reflection. *Ingenuousness*, makes us declare what we know; and, is, often, a folly.

A *sincere* man, will not deceive; a *frank* man, will not dissemble; a *plain* man, is not apt to flatter; an *ingenuous* man, knows not how to conceal any thing.

Sincerity,

Sincerity, is of great value, in the intercourse of the heart. *Frankness*, facilitates the commerce of the world. *Plainness*, is, often, considered, as a want of politeness. *Ingenuoufness*, is, frequently, found to err, against prudence.

The *sincere*, are, always, esteemed. The *frank*, please all the world. The *plain*, sometimes, offend. The *ingenuous*, often, betray themselves.

207.

Experiment,
Trial,
Proof.

Experiment, relates, properly, to the truth of things; it determines, whether a thing is, or, is not; clearing up of doubt, and, dissipating ignorance. *Trial*, concerns, particularly, the use of things; judging, whether they are proper, or, not; it settles the matter, and, determines the will. *Proof*, has a greater relation to the quality of things; teaching us, whether they are good, or, bad, distinguishing the best, and taking away any fear of being deceived.

We make *experiments*, in order, to know: *trials*, to choose; and, *proofs*, to be, thoroughly, acquainted with.

Experiments, confirm our opinions; being the root of knowledge. *Trial*, conducts our taste; being the road to satisfaction. *Proof*, removes our fears; and, is a remedy against error and imposture.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.